Daily Papers

Post-training alignment in large reasoning models (LRMs) has significantly improved their adaptability to diverse safety compliance settings. However, as LRMs personalization for downstream users takes center stage, the demand for varying levels of policy compliance grows as different user-specific LRMs must adhere to distinct subsets of safety policies. Training a separate LRM for each policy subset introduces severe combinatorial overhead. While in context learning methods overcome this combinatorial overhead, they introduce additional computational challenges associated with long context generation. To address this challenge, we propose \ours, a unified adaptive hypernetwork-based framework for multi-policy compliance. In our framework, safety policies serve as customizable inputs to a LoRA adapter generator, which learns to produce policy compliant LoRA weights for downstream LRM. When added to the LRM these weights enable the generation of responses compliant with the specified policy subsets. In this work, we demonstrate that training such a hypernetwork enables on-demand policy adjustments on a single LRM without sacrificing task performance across reasoning models of different sized and different evaluation datasets. This highlights the effectiveness and practicality of adaptive hypernetwork based alignment in LRMs.

Ensuring the safety and compliance of large language models (LLMs) is of paramount importance. However, existing LLM safety datasets often rely on ad-hoc taxonomies for data generation and suffer from a significant shortage of rule-grounded, real-world cases that are essential for robustly protecting LLMs. In this work, we address this critical gap by constructing a comprehensive safety dataset from a compliance perspective. Using a powerful web-searching agent, we collect a rule-grounded, real-world case dataset OmniCompliance-100K, sourced from multi-domain authoritative references. The dataset spans 74 regulations and policies across a wide range of domains, including security and privacy regulations, content safety and user data privacy policies from leading AI companies and social media platforms, financial security requirements, medical device risk management standards, educational integrity guidelines, and protections of fundamental human rights. In total, our dataset contains 12,985 distinct rules and 106,009 associated real-world compliance cases. Our analysis confirms a strong alignment between the rules and their corresponding cases. We further conduct extensive benchmarking experiments to evaluate the safety and compliance capabilities of advanced LLMs across different model scales. Our experiments reveal several interesting findings that have great potential to offer valuable insights for future LLM safety research.

Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque. In this work, we investigate whether safety compliance is a deep semantic decision or a manipulable linear feature. We introduce Contrastive Logit Steering (CLS), a zero-optimization framework that isolates the "refusal direction" by contrasting hidden states derived from safe and unrestricted system prompts. Unlike representation engineering methods that intervene on internal activations, CLS operates directly on the output distribution, serving as a diagnostic probe for alignment fragility. When coupled with prefix injection to bypass initial refusal reflexes, this method induces a phase transition where guardrails collapse. Our experiments on 7 model families reveal that safety implementation is architecturally deterministic. While models like Llama-3.1 exhibit a "Late Decision" topology that is easily bypassed by CLS (reaching 95% ASR in approximately one second), others like Qwen-2.5 demonstrate "Early Divergence" by integrating safety mid-computation. Direct comparison with established activation-level steering methods shows that CLS achieves substantially higher attack success rates on Llama 2 (73% vs. 22.6%) and Qwen 7B (91% vs. 79.2%), demonstrating that logit-level intervention exposes alignment vulnerabilities that hidden-state methods underestimate. Beyond attacks, we show that this linearity enables bidirectional control: inverting the steering vector "hardens" models against jailbreaks without retraining. Our findings suggest that current alignment techniques create a steerable "safety axis" that serves as both a critical vulnerability and a precise primitive for defense.

Recent advancements in Large Generative Models (LGMs) have revolutionized multi-modal generation. However, generating illustrated storybooks remains an open challenge, where prior works mainly decompose this task into separate stages, and thus, holistic multi-modal grounding remains limited. Besides, while safety alignment is studied for text- or image-only generation, existing works rarely integrate child-specific safety constraints into narrative planning and sequence-level multi-modal verification. To address these limitations, we propose BookAgent, a safety-aware multi-agent collaboration framework designed for high-quality, safety-aware visual narratives. Different from prior story visualization models that assume a fixed storyline sequence, BookAgent targets end-to-end storybook synthesis from a user draft by jointly planning, scripting, illustrating, and globally repairing inconsistencies. To ensure precise multi-modal grounding, BookAgent dynamically calibrates page-level alignment between textual scripts and visual layouts. Furthermore, BookAgent calibrates holistic consistency from the temporal dimension, by verifying-then-rectifying global inconsistencies in character identity and storytelling logic. Extensive experiments demonstrate that BookAgent significantly outperforms current methods in narrative coherence, visual consistency, and safety compliance, offering a robust paradigm for reliable agents in complex multi-modal creation. The implementation will be publicly released at https://github.com/bogao-code/BookAgent/tree/main.

On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for safety alignment, delivering dense, token-level supervision by distilling from a teacher conditioned on refusal-oriented privileged prompts. However, we reveal that this paradigm suffers from critical inefficiencies that degrade both training efficiency and general reasoning capabilities. Specifically, we diagnose two fundamental bottlenecks: (1) supervisory collapse over extended rollouts, where the teacher's corrective efficacy degrades precipitously as the student's generation prefix lengthens, injecting noisy gradients into late-stage tokens; and (2) gradient dilution from stylistic shifts, where the distillation objective is dominated by safety-irrelevant stylistic discrepancies induced by privileged prompting, washing out genuine safety signals and impairing base reasoning. To resolve these issues, we propose Efficient On-Policy Self-Distilled Safety Alignment (EOPSA), which concentrates computational and gradient budgets exclusively on reliably supervised, safety-critical tokens. EOPSA incorporates two coordinated mechanisms: (i) Adaptive Rollout Scheduling, which dynamically bounds the generation horizon guided by a novel Teacher Rescue Rate (TRR) metric to operate strictly within reliable supervision regimes; and (ii) Selective Distillation, which filters out safety-neutral tokens to restrict gradient updates exclusively to safety-pivotal transitions. Extensive evaluations across reasoning models up to 32B parameters demonstrate that EOPSA slashes rollout computation by sim50% and backpropagates through merely sim2% of tokens, consistently outperforming full-token distillation baselines in both safety compliance and reasoning retention.

We introduce LlavaGuard, a family of VLM-based safeguard models, offering a versatile framework for evaluating the safety compliance of visual content. Specifically, we designed LlavaGuard for dataset annotation and generative model safeguarding. To this end, we collected and annotated a high-quality visual dataset incorporating a broad safety taxonomy, which we use to tune VLMs on context-aware safety risks. As a key innovation, LlavaGuard's new responses contain comprehensive information, including a safety rating, the violated safety categories, and an in-depth rationale. Further, our introduced customizable taxonomy categories enable the context-specific alignment of LlavaGuard to various scenarios. Our experiments highlight the capabilities of LlavaGuard in complex and real-world applications. We provide checkpoints ranging from 7B to 34B parameters demonstrating state-of-the-art performance, with even the smallest models outperforming baselines like GPT-4. We make our dataset and model weights publicly available and invite further research to address the diverse needs of communities and contexts.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used as the reasoning backbone of embodied agents, enabling robots to interpret visual scenes, follow language instructions, and plan multi-step actions. In household environments, however, safety depends not only on recognizing objects, but also on how actions change the physical scene over time. Existing embodied safety evaluations largely focus on static risk recognition, unsafe instruction refusal, or final-state task completion. As a result, process-level safety failures induced by spatial relations such as support, containment, and proximity remain insufficiently studied. To address this gap, we introduce SAFERELBENCH, a spatial-relation-aware safety benchmark with 507 executable evaluation samples, including 248 spatial-relation samples and 259 non-spatial control samples. Using SAFERELBENCH to evaluate seven open- and closed-source VLM-driven embodied agents, we find a substantial gap between task success and process-level safety compliance: models often complete the requested task while violating process-level safety constraints. Unlike prior benchmarks, SAFERELBENCH explicitly tests whether agents satisfy safety conditions before risk-prone actions, making spatial relations a core dimension in embodied safety assessment. More broadly, our results show that safe embodied intelligence requires not only stronger perception and planning, but also reliable reasoning about how object relations shape risk during interaction.

While household robots are often evaluated based on task completion, everyday domestic environments involve value-conflicting situations in which robots are expected to choose actions that prioritize other values than task success, such as human autonomy, efficiency, or social appropriateness. Yet, there are no benchmarks for evaluating robots' value preferences in such scenarios. We introduce RobotValues, a benchmark to evaluate household robot planners in 10K value-conflict scenarios. Each instance consists of a realistic household image with multiple plausible robot actions that prioritize different human values. We construct RobotValues through LLM-assisted scenario generation, stakeholder-grounded value extraction, image generation and automatic quality control. Using RobotValues we evaluate VLMs used in robotics and find that models exhibit default value preferences, including safety and accommodation, while underselecting privacy-prioritizing actions. When the models are instructed to prioritize specific values that conflict with their own preferences, they often fail to override their default actions, choosing incorrect actions for 80% of the time. These findings suggest that household robot evaluation should measure not only task completion or safety compliance, but also whether robots can choose among plausible actions when human values conflict.

Persona conditioning can be viewed as a behavioral prior for large language models (LLMs) and is often assumed to confer expertise and improve safety in a monotonic manner. However, its effects on high-stakes clinical decision-making remain poorly characterized. We systematically evaluate persona-based control in clinical LLMs, examining how professional roles (e.g., Emergency Department physician, nurse) and interaction styles (bold vs.\ cautious) influence behavior across models and medical tasks. We assess performance on clinical triage and patient-safety tasks using multidimensional evaluations that capture task accuracy, calibration, and safety-relevant risk behavior. We find systematic, context-dependent, and non-monotonic effects: Medical personas improve performance in critical care tasks, yielding gains of up to sim+20% in accuracy and calibration, but degrade performance in primary-care settings by comparable margins. Interaction style modulates risk propensity and sensitivity, but it's highly model-dependent. While aggregated LLM-judge rankings favor medical over non-medical personas in safety-critical cases, we found that human clinicians show moderate agreement on safety compliance (average Cohen's κ= 0.43) but indicate a low confidence in 95.9\% of their responses on reasoning quality. Our work shows that personas function as behavioral priors that introduce context-dependent trade-offs rather than guarantees of safety or expertise. The code is available at https://github.com/rsinghlab/Persona\_Paradox.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly entering children's lives - through parent-driven adoption, schools, and peer networks - yet current AI ethics and safety research do not adequately address content-related risks specific to minors. In this paper, we highlight these gaps with a real-world case study of an LLM-based chatbot deployed in a middle school setting, revealing how students used and sometimes misused the system. Building on these findings, we propose a new taxonomy of content-based risks for minors and introduce MinorBench, an open-source benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs on their ability to refuse unsafe or inappropriate queries from children. We evaluate six prominent LLMs under different system prompts, demonstrating substantial variability in their child-safety compliance. Our results inform practical steps for more robust, child-focused safety mechanisms and underscore the urgency of tailoring AI systems to safeguard young users.

In industrial procurement, an LLM answer is useful only if it survives a standards check: recommended material must match operating condition, every parameter must respect a regulated threshold, and no procedure may contradict a safety clause. Partial correctness can mask safety-critical contradictions that aggregate LLM benchmarks rarely capture. We introduce IndustryBench, a 2,049-item benchmark for industrial procurement QA in Chinese, grounded in Chinese national standards (GB/T) and structured industrial product records, organized by seven capability dimensions, ten industry categories, and panel-derived difficulty tiers, with item-aligned English, Russian, and Vietnamese renderings. Our construction pipeline rejects 70.3% of LLM-generated candidates at a search-based external-verification stage, calibrating how unreliable industrial QA remains after LLM-only filtering.Our evaluation decouples raw correctness, scored by a Qwen3-Max judge validated at κ_w = 0.798 against a domain expert, from a separate safety-violation (SV) check against source texts. Across 17 models in Chinese and an 8-model intersection over four languages, we find: (i) the best system reaches only 2.083 on the 0--3 rubric, leaving substantial headroom; (ii) Standards & Terminology is the most persistent capability weakness and survives item-aligned translation; (iii) extended reasoning lowers safety-adjusted scores for 12 of 13 models, primarily by introducing unsupported safety-critical details into longer final answers; and (iv) safety-violation rates reshuffle the leaderboard -- GPT-5.4 climbs from rank 6 to rank 3 after SV adjustment, while Kimi-k2.5-1T-A32B drops seven positions.Industrial LLM evaluation therefore requires source-grounded, safety-aware diagnosis rather than aggregate accuracy. We release IndustryBench with all prompts, scoring scripts, and dataset documentation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for decision-making and planning in autonomous driving, showing promising reasoning capabilities and potential to generalize across diverse traffic situations. However, current LLM-based driving agents lack explicit mechanisms to enforce traffic rules and often struggle to reliably detect small, safety-critical objects such as traffic lights and signs. To address this limitation, we introduce TLS-Assist, a modular redundancy layer that augments LLM-based autonomous driving agents with explicit traffic light and sign recognition. TLS-Assist converts detections into structured natural language messages that are injected into the LLM input, enforcing explicit attention to safety-critical cues. The framework is plug-and-play, model-agnostic, and supports both single-view and multi-view camera setups. We evaluate TLS-Assist in a closed-loop setup on the LangAuto benchmark in CARLA. The results demonstrate relative driving performance improvements of up to 14% over LMDrive and 7% over BEVDriver, while consistently reducing traffic light and sign infractions. We publicly release the code and models on https://github.com/iis-esslingen/TLS-Assist.

Despite rapid advances in large language models (LLMs), their deployment in the sports and health domain remains high-risk due to the absence of domain-specific evaluation benchmarks. Existing general-purpose benchmarks (e.g., MMLU and HELM) primarily assess broad knowledge and reasoning capabilities, but fail to capture critical domain requirements such as exercise safety, physiological appropriateness, personalization, and actionable coaching quality. This gap is particularly concerning in fitness and health applications, where incorrect or unsafe recommendations can lead to physical harm. To address this limitation, we introduce MoveBench, the first comprehensive benchmarking framework specifically designed for evaluating LLMs in sports and health coaching. The proposed benchmark integrates heterogeneous task formats, including multiple-choice questions (MCQs) and open-ended question answering (OpenQA), grounded in real-world user scenarios and paired with structured rubrics emphasizing safety compliance, scientific validity, and training logic. Through large-scale evaluation of 15 diverse LLMs on 809 questions with 5,012 rubric-level criteria, our results reveal substantial performance variability, particularly in safety awareness, structured program design, and personalization capability, highlighting a critical gap between knowing and doing. Our work establishes a foundational evaluation standard for sports and health LLM applications and provides a reproducible framework for advancing safe, reliable, and context-aware AI-driven coaching systems. Open resources are available at https://github.com/SatoSakula/MoveBench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit significant behavioral shifts when they perceive a change from a real-world deployment context to a controlled evaluation setting, a phenomenon known as "evaluation awareness." This discrepancy poses a critical challenge for AI alignment, as benchmark performance may not accurately reflect a model's true safety and honesty. In this work, we systematically quantify these behavioral changes by manipulating the perceived context of prompts. We introduce a methodology that uses a linear probe to score prompts on a continuous scale from "test-like" to "deploy-like" and leverage an LLM rewriting strategy to shift these prompts towards a more natural, deployment-style context while preserving the original task. Using this method, we achieved a 30% increase in the average probe score across a strategic role-playing dataset after rewriting. Evaluating a suite of state-of-the-art models on these original and rewritten prompts, we find that rewritten "deploy-like" prompts induce a significant and consistent shift in behavior. Across all models, we observed an average increase in honest responses of 5.26% and a corresponding average decrease in deceptive responses of 12.40%. Furthermore, refusal rates increased by an average of 6.38%, indicating heightened safety compliance. Our findings demonstrate that evaluation awareness is a quantifiable and manipulable factor that directly influences LLM behavior, revealing that models are more prone to unsafe or deceptive outputs in perceived test environments. This underscores the urgent need for more realistic evaluation frameworks to accurately gauge true model alignment before deployment.

We present Mify-Coder, a 2.5B-parameter code model trained on 4.2T tokens using a compute-optimal strategy built on the Mify-2.5B foundation model. Mify-Coder achieves comparable accuracy and safety while significantly outperforming much larger baseline models on standard coding and function-calling benchmarks, demonstrating that compact models can match frontier-grade models in code generation and agent-driven workflows. Our training pipeline combines high-quality curated sources with synthetic data generated through agentically designed prompts, refined iteratively using enterprise-grade evaluation datasets. LLM-based quality filtering further enhances data density, enabling frugal yet effective training. Through disciplined exploration of CPT-SFT objectives, data mixtures, and sampling dynamics, we deliver frontier-grade code intelligence within a single continuous training trajectory. Empirical evidence shows that principled data and compute discipline allow smaller models to achieve competitive accuracy, efficiency, and safety compliance. Quantized variants of Mify-Coder enable deployment on standard desktop environments without requiring specialized hardware.

India is a vast nation of over 1.4 billion people, varied by hundreds of diverse and locally specific traditions and cultures and 22 officially recognized languages. Large language models (LLMs) are now being deployed on a massive scale throughout the mainland as well as in remote villages. However, the common benchmarks - MMLU, BIG-Bench, and TruthfulQA are almost exclusively English- and Western-centric. They do not identify those safety, fairness, and accuracy failures unique to the Indian context. That is the gap Inspect India Evals seeks to fill. It is an open-source framework built on top of UK AISI's Inspect AI platform. It has six benchmarks: Multilingual MMLU across sixteen Indian languages, BharatBBQ (our adaptation of BBQ for Indian social bias), a safety evaluation for Digital Public Infrastructure, a multilingual safety test using harmful prompts in Indian languages, a multi-turn jailbreak resistance test, and an Indian cultural knowledge benchmark scored using LLM-as-judge rubrics. In this study, we tested five open-weight models ranging from 8B to 32B parameters. Sarvam-M 24B and Gemma 2 27B came out on top, both scoring 80% on the composite India Fairness Index, with Sarvam-M even beating larger 32B models on Indian cultural knowledge and DPI safety compliance. All models scored 100% refusal on Multilingual Safety, whereas DPI safety varied from 20% to 100%. The framework is public. It's built to work with the UK AISI registry. Anyone can reproduce or extend this work.

Autonomous agents powered by foundation models have seen widespread adoption across various real-world applications. However, they remain highly vulnerable to malicious instructions and attacks, which can result in severe consequences such as privacy breaches and financial losses. More critically, existing guardrails for LLMs are not applicable due to the complex and dynamic nature of agents. To tackle these challenges, we propose ShieldAgent, the first guardrail agent designed to enforce explicit safety policy compliance for the action trajectory of other protected agents through logical reasoning. Specifically, ShieldAgent first constructs a safety policy model by extracting verifiable rules from policy documents and structuring them into a set of action-based probabilistic rule circuits. Given the action trajectory of the protected agent, ShieldAgent retrieves relevant rule circuits and generates a shielding plan, leveraging its comprehensive tool library and executable code for formal verification. In addition, given the lack of guardrail benchmarks for agents, we introduce ShieldAgent-Bench, a dataset with 3K safety-related pairs of agent instructions and action trajectories, collected via SOTA attacks across 6 web environments and 7 risk categories. Experiments show that ShieldAgent achieves SOTA on ShieldAgent-Bench and three existing benchmarks, outperforming prior methods by 11.3% on average with a high recall of 90.1%. Additionally, ShieldAgent reduces API queries by 64.7% and inference time by 58.2%, demonstrating its high precision and efficiency in safeguarding agents.

We propose a theoretical framework demonstrating that popular Large Language Model (LLM) alignment methods, including Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and alternatives, fundamentally function as divergence estimators between aligned (preferred or safe) and unaligned (less-preferred or harmful) distributions. This explains the separation phenomenon between safe and harmful prompts in the model hidden representation after alignment. Inspired by the theoretical results, we identify that some alignment methods are better than others in terms of separation and, introduce a new method, KLDO, and further demonstrate the implication of our theories. We advocate for compliance-refusal datasets over preference datasets to enhance safety alignment, supported by both theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence. Additionally, to quantify safety separation, we leverage a distance metric in the representation space and statistically validate its efficacy as a statistical significant indicator of LLM resilience against jailbreak attacks.

Recent advancements in Web agents have introduced novel architectures and benchmarks showcasing progress in autonomous web navigation and interaction. However, most existing benchmarks prioritize effectiveness and accuracy, overlooking factors like safety and trustworthiness which are essential for deploying web agents in enterprise settings. We present STWebAgentBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate web agents safety and trustworthiness across six critical dimensions, essential for reliability in enterprise applications. This benchmark is grounded in a detailed framework that defines safe and trustworthy (ST) agent behavior. Our work extends WebArena with safety templates and evaluation functions to assess safety policy compliance rigorously. We introduce the Completion Under Policy to measure task success while adhering to policies, alongside the Risk Ratio, which quantifies policy violations across dimensions, providing actionable insights to address safety gaps. Our evaluation reveals that current SOTA agents struggle with policy adherence and cannot yet be relied upon for critical business applications. We open-source this benchmark and invite the community to contribute, with the goal of fostering a new generation of safer, more trustworthy AI agents. All code, data, environment reproduction resources, and video demonstrations are available at https://sites.google.com/view/st-webagentbench/home.

The rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into high-stakes domains necessitates reliable safety and compliance evaluation. However, existing static benchmarks are ill-equipped to address the dynamic nature of AI risks and evolving regulations, creating a critical safety gap. This paper introduces a new paradigm of agentic safety evaluation, reframing evaluation as a continuous and self-evolving process rather than a one-time audit. We then propose a novel multi-agent framework SafeEvalAgent, which autonomously ingests unstructured policy documents to generate and perpetually evolve a comprehensive safety benchmark. SafeEvalAgent leverages a synergistic pipeline of specialized agents and incorporates a Self-evolving Evaluation loop, where the system learns from evaluation results to craft progressively more sophisticated and targeted test cases. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of SafeEvalAgent, showing a consistent decline in model safety as the evaluation hardens. For instance, GPT-5's safety rate on the EU AI Act drops from 72.50% to 36.36% over successive iterations. These findings reveal the limitations of static assessments and highlight our framework's ability to uncover deep vulnerabilities missed by traditional methods, underscoring the urgent need for dynamic evaluation ecosystems to ensure the safe and responsible deployment of advanced AI.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-risk domains such as law, finance, and medicine, systematically evaluating their domain-specific safety and compliance becomes critical. While prior work has largely focused on improving LLM performance in these domains, it has often neglected the evaluation of domain-specific safety risks. To bridge this gap, we first define domain-specific safety principles for LLMs based on the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the CFA Institute Code of Ethics. Building on this foundation, we introduce Trident-Bench, a benchmark specifically targeting LLM safety in the legal, financial, and medical domains. We evaluated 19 general-purpose and domain-specialized models on Trident-Bench and show that it effectively reveals key safety gaps -- strong generalist models (e.g., GPT, Gemini) can meet basic expectations, whereas domain-specialized models often struggle with subtle ethical nuances. This highlights an urgent need for finer-grained domain-specific safety improvements. By introducing Trident-Bench, our work provides one of the first systematic resources for studying LLM safety in law and finance, and lays the groundwork for future research aimed at reducing the safety risks of deploying LLMs in professionally regulated fields. Code and benchmark will be released at: https://github.com/zackhuiiiii/TRIDENT

KT developed a Responsible AI (RAI) assessment methodology and risk mitigation technologies to ensure the safety and reliability of AI services. By analyzing the Basic Act on AI implementation and global AI governance trends, we established a unique approach for regulatory compliance and systematically identify and manage all potential risk factors from AI development to operation. We present a reliable assessment methodology that systematically verifies model safety and robustness based on KT's AI risk taxonomy tailored to the domestic environment. We also provide practical tools for managing and mitigating identified AI risks. With the release of this report, we also release proprietary Guardrail : SafetyGuard that blocks harmful responses from AI models in real-time, supporting the enhancement of safety in the domestic AI development ecosystem. We also believe these research outcomes provide valuable insights for organizations seeking to develop Responsible AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in memorizing vast amounts of knowledge across diverse domains. However, the ability to selectively forget specific knowledge is critical for ensuring the safety and compliance of deployed models. Existing unlearning efforts typically fine-tune the model with resources such as forget data, retain data, and a calibration model. These additional gradient steps blur the decision boundary between forget and retain knowledge, making unlearning often at the expense of overall performance. To avoid the negative impact of fine-tuning, it would be better to unlearn solely at inference time by safely guarding the model against generating responses related to the forget target, without destroying the fluency of text generation. In this work, we propose Generation-time Unlearning via Adaptive Restriction and Detection (GUARD), a framework that enables dynamic unlearning during LLM generation. Specifically, we first employ a prompt classifier to detect unlearning targets and extract the corresponding forbidden token. We then dynamically penalize and filter candidate tokens during generation using a combination of token matching and semantic matching, effectively preventing the model from leaking the forgotten content. Experimental results on copyright content unlearning tasks over the Harry Potter dataset and the MUSE benchmark, as well as entity unlearning tasks on the TOFU dataset, demonstrate that GUARD achieves strong forget quality across various tasks while causing almost no degradation to the LLM's general capabilities, striking an excellent trade-off between forgetting and utility.

Contemporary large language model (LLM) agents are remarkably capable, but they still lack reliable safety controls and can produce unconstrained, unpredictable, and even actively harmful outputs. To address this, we introduce Reflection-Driven Control, a standardized and pluggable control module that can be seamlessly integrated into general agent architectures. Reflection-Driven Control elevates "self-reflection" from a post hoc patch into an explicit step in the agent's own reasoning process: during generation, the agent continuously runs an internal reflection loop that monitors and evaluates its own decision path. When potential risks are detected, the system retrieves relevant repair examples and secure coding guidelines from an evolving reflective memory, injecting these evidence-based constraints directly into subsequent reasoning steps. We instantiate Reflection-Driven Control in the setting of secure code generation and systematically evaluate it across eight classes of security-critical programming tasks. Empirical results show that Reflection-Driven Control substantially improves the security and policy compliance of generated code while largely preserving functional correctness, with minimal runtime and token overhead. Taken together, these findings indicate that Reflection-Driven Control is a practical path toward trustworthy AI coding agents: it enables designs that are simultaneously autonomous, safer by construction, and auditable.

Large Language Models have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various language tasks but may produce content that misaligns with human expectations, raising ethical and legal concerns. Therefore, it is important to explore the limitations and implement restrictions on the models to ensure safety and compliance, with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) being the primary method. Due to challenges in stability and scalability with the RLHF stages, researchers are exploring alternative methods to achieve effects comparable to those of RLHF. However, these methods often depend on large high-quality datasets and inefficiently utilize generated data. To deal with this problem, we propose PSLE, i.e., Progressively Selective Label Enhancement for Language Model Alignment, a framework that fully utilizes all generated data by guiding the model with principles to align outputs with human expectations. Using a dynamically updated threshold, our approach ensures efficient data utilization by incorporating all generated responses and weighting them based on their corresponding reward scores. Experimental results on multiple datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of PSLE compared to existing language model alignment methods.

Large language models (LLMs) represent a transformative class of AI tools capable of revolutionizing various aspects of healthcare by generating human-like responses across diverse contexts and adapting to novel tasks following human instructions. Their potential application spans a broad range of medical tasks, such as clinical documentation, matching patients to clinical trials, and answering medical questions. In this primer paper, we propose an actionable guideline to help healthcare professionals more efficiently utilize LLMs in their work, along with a set of best practices. This approach consists of several main phases, including formulating the task, choosing LLMs, prompt engineering, fine-tuning, and deployment. We start with the discussion of critical considerations in identifying healthcare tasks that align with the core capabilities of LLMs and selecting models based on the selected task and data, performance requirements, and model interface. We then review the strategies, such as prompt engineering and fine-tuning, to adapt standard LLMs to specialized medical tasks. Deployment considerations, including regulatory compliance, ethical guidelines, and continuous monitoring for fairness and bias, are also discussed. By providing a structured step-by-step methodology, this tutorial aims to equip healthcare professionals with the tools necessary to effectively integrate LLMs into clinical practice, ensuring that these powerful technologies are applied in a safe, reliable, and impactful manner.

As language models are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, the ability to erase specific knowledge from them becomes critical for safety and compliance. Prominent methods seek persistent removal by updating the model's parameters, yet the target knowledge often can be recovered through adversarial prompting or relearning. In this work, we hypothesize this limitation stems in part from existing methods overlooking the embedding layer. To address this, we introduce EMBedding ERasure (EMBER), a plug-n-play erasure module that leverages Sparse Matrix Factorization for precise erasure of concept-related features from token embeddings. Through comprehensive evaluations across diverse concepts on Gemma-2-2B-it and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, we find that augmenting existing methods with EMBER consistently improves erasure efficacy and specificity across task formats, with minimal coherence loss. Moreover, it dramatically improves robustness to relearning, reducing regained accuracy by up to 50%, limiting it to 35% on Llama compared to 70%-76% for prior methods. Further analysis shows that the coherence cost is localized, affecting only a small set of concept-exclusive tokens. Our work establishes that precise embedding-level intervention is necessary for robust concept erasure, and demonstrates that existing methods can benefit from such augmentation.

Since FineWeb-Edu, data curation for LLM pretraining has predominantly relied on single scalar quality scores produced by small classifiers. A single score conflates multiple quality dimensions, prevents flexible filtering, and offers no interpretability. We introduce propella-1, a family of small multilingual LLMs (0.6B, 1.7B, 4B parameters) that annotate text documents across 18 properties organized into six categories: core content, classification, quality and value, audience and purpose, safety and compliance, and geographic relevance. The models support 57 languages and produce structured JSON annotations conforming to a predefined schema. Evaluated against a frontier commercial LLM as a reference annotator, the 4B model achieves higher agreement than much larger general-purpose models. We release propella-annotations, a dataset of over three billion document annotations covering major pretraining corpora including data from FineWeb-2, FinePDFs, HPLT 3.0, and Nemotron-CC. Using these annotations, we present a multi-dimensional compositional analysis of widely used pretraining datasets, revealing substantial differences in quality, reasoning depth, and content composition that single-score approaches cannot capture. All model weights and annotations are released under permissive, commercial-use licenses.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve remarkable performance by leveraging reinforcement learning (RL) on reasoning tasks to generate long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. However, this over-optimization often prioritizes compliance, making models vulnerable to harmful prompts. To mitigate this safety degradation, recent approaches rely on external teacher distillation, yet this introduces a distributional discrepancy that degrades native reasoning. We propose ThinkSafe, a self-generated alignment framework that restores safety alignment without external teachers. Our key insight is that while compliance suppresses safety mechanisms, models often retain latent knowledge to identify harm. ThinkSafe unlocks this via lightweight refusal steering, guiding the model to generate in-distribution safety reasoning traces. Fine-tuning on these self-generated responses effectively realigns the model while minimizing distribution shift. Experiments on DeepSeek-R1-Distill and Qwen3 show ThinkSafe significantly improves safety while preserving reasoning proficiency. Notably, it achieves superior safety and comparable reasoning to GRPO, with significantly reduced computational cost. Code, models, and datasets are available at https://github.com/seanie12/ThinkSafe.git.

Safety limitations in service robotics across various industries have raised significant concerns about the need for robust mechanisms ensuring that robots adhere to safe practices, thereby preventing actions that might harm humans or cause property damage. Despite advances, including the integration of Knowledge Graphs (KGs) with Large Language Models (LLMs), challenges in ensuring consistent safety in autonomous robot actions persist. In this paper, we propose a novel integration of Large Language Models with Embodied Robotic Control Prompts (ERCPs) and Embodied Knowledge Graphs (EKGs) to enhance the safety framework for service robots. ERCPs are designed as predefined instructions that ensure LLMs generate safe and precise responses. These responses are subsequently validated by EKGs, which provide a comprehensive knowledge base ensuring that the actions of the robot are continuously aligned with safety protocols, thereby promoting safer operational practices in varied contexts. Our experimental setup involved diverse real-world tasks, where robots equipped with our framework demonstrated significantly higher compliance with safety standards compared to traditional methods. This integration fosters secure human-robot interactions and positions our methodology at the forefront of AI-driven safety innovations in service robotics.

Advanced AI models hold the promise of tremendous benefits for humanity, but society needs to proactively manage the accompanying risks. In this paper, we focus on what we term "frontier AI" models: highly capable foundation models that could possess dangerous capabilities sufficient to pose severe risks to public safety. Frontier AI models pose a distinct regulatory challenge: dangerous capabilities can arise unexpectedly; it is difficult to robustly prevent a deployed model from being misused; and, it is difficult to stop a model's capabilities from proliferating broadly. To address these challenges, at least three building blocks for the regulation of frontier models are needed: (1) standard-setting processes to identify appropriate requirements for frontier AI developers, (2) registration and reporting requirements to provide regulators with visibility into frontier AI development processes, and (3) mechanisms to ensure compliance with safety standards for the development and deployment of frontier AI models. Industry self-regulation is an important first step. However, wider societal discussions and government intervention will be needed to create standards and to ensure compliance with them. We consider several options to this end, including granting enforcement powers to supervisory authorities and licensure regimes for frontier AI models. Finally, we propose an initial set of safety standards. These include conducting pre-deployment risk assessments; external scrutiny of model behavior; using risk assessments to inform deployment decisions; and monitoring and responding to new information about model capabilities and uses post-deployment. We hope this discussion contributes to the broader conversation on how to balance public safety risks and innovation benefits from advances at the frontier of AI development.

The rapid development of large reasoning models, such as OpenAI-o3 and DeepSeek-R1, has led to significant improvements in complex reasoning over non-reasoning large language models~(LLMs). However, their enhanced capabilities, combined with the open-source access of models like DeepSeek-R1, raise serious safety concerns, particularly regarding their potential for misuse. In this work, we present a comprehensive safety assessment of these reasoning models, leveraging established safety benchmarks to evaluate their compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, we investigate their susceptibility to adversarial attacks, such as jailbreaking and prompt injection, to assess their robustness in real-world applications. Through our multi-faceted analysis, we uncover four key findings: (1) There is a significant safety gap between the open-source R1 models and the o3-mini model, on both safety benchmark and attack, suggesting more safety effort on R1 is needed. (2) The distilled reasoning model shows poorer safety performance compared to its safety-aligned base models. (3) The stronger the model's reasoning ability, the greater the potential harm it may cause when answering unsafe questions. (4) The thinking process in R1 models pose greater safety concerns than their final answers. Our study provides insights into the security implications of reasoning models and highlights the need for further advancements in R1 models' safety to close the gap.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generalizing across diverse robotic manipulation tasks. However, deploying these models in unstructured environments remains challenging due to the critical need for simultaneous task compliance and safety assurance, particularly in preventing potential collisions during physical interactions. In this work, we introduce a Vision-Language-Safe Action (VLSA) architecture, named AEGIS, which contains a plug-and-play safety constraint (SC) layer formulated via control barrier functions. AEGIS integrates directly with existing VLA models to improve safety with theoretical guarantees, while maintaining their original instruction-following performance. To evaluate the efficacy of our architecture, we construct a comprehensive safety-critical benchmark SafeLIBERO, spanning distinct manipulation scenarios characterized by varying degrees of spatial complexity and obstacle intervention. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of our method over state-of-the-art baselines. Notably, AEGIS achieves a 59.16% improvement in obstacle avoidance rate while substantially increasing the task execution success rate by 17.25%. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, we make our code, models, and the benchmark datasets publicly available at https://vlsa-aegis.github.io/.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advanced reasoning skills, enabling robots to comprehend natural language instructions and strategically plan high-level actions through proper grounding. However, LLM hallucination may result in robots confidently executing plans that are misaligned with user goals or even unsafe in critical scenarios. Additionally, inherent ambiguity in natural language instructions can introduce uncertainty into the LLM's reasoning and planning processes.We propose introspective planning, a systematic approach that align LLM's uncertainty with the inherent ambiguity of the task. Our approach constructs a knowledge base containing introspective reasoning examples as post-hoc rationalizations of human-selected safe and compliant plans, which are retrieved during deployment. Evaluations on three tasks, including a newly introduced safe mobile manipulation benchmark, demonstrate that introspection substantially improves both compliance and safety over state-of-the-art LLM-based planning methods. Furthermore, we empirically show that introspective planning, in combination with conformal prediction, achieves tighter confidence bounds, maintaining statistical success guarantees while minimizing unnecessary user clarification requests. The webpage and code are accessible at https://introplan.github.io.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained considerable popularity and protected by increasingly sophisticated safety mechanisms. However, jailbreak attacks continue to pose a critical security threat by inducing models to generate policy-violating behaviors. Current paradigms focus on input-level anomalies, overlooking that the model's internal psychometric state can be systematically manipulated. To address this, we introduce Psychological Jailbreak, a new jailbreak attack paradigm that exposes a stateful psychological attack surface in LLMs, where attackers exploit the manipulation of a model's psychological state across interactions. Building on this insight, we propose Human-like Psychological Manipulation (HPM), a black-box jailbreak method that dynamically profiles a target model's latent psychological vulnerabilities and synthesizes tailored multi-turn attack strategies. By leveraging the model's optimization for anthropomorphic consistency, HPM creates a psychological pressure where social compliance overrides safety constraints. To systematically measure psychological safety, we construct an evaluation framework incorporating psychometric datasets and the Policy Corruption Score (PCS). Benchmarking against various models (e.g., GPT-4o, DeepSeek-V3, Gemini-2-Flash), HPM achieves a mean Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 88.1%, outperforming state-of-the-art attack baselines. Our experiments demonstrate robust penetration against advanced defenses, including adversarial prompt optimization (e.g., RPO) and cognitive interventions (e.g., Self-Reminder). Ultimately, PCS analysis confirms HPM induces safety breakdown to satisfy manipulated contexts. Our work advocates for a fundamental paradigm shift from static content filtering to psychological safety, prioritizing the development of psychological defense mechanisms against deep cognitive manipulation.

The advent of powerful neural classifiers has increased interest in problems that require both learning and reasoning. These problems are critical for understanding important properties of models, such as trustworthiness, generalization, interpretability, and compliance to safety and structural constraints. However, recent research observed that tasks requiring both learning and reasoning on background knowledge often suffer from reasoning shortcuts (RSs): predictors can solve the downstream reasoning task without associating the correct concepts to the high-dimensional data. To address this issue, we introduce rsbench, a comprehensive benchmark suite designed to systematically evaluate the impact of RSs on models by providing easy access to highly customizable tasks affected by RSs. Furthermore, rsbench implements common metrics for evaluating concept quality and introduces novel formal verification procedures for assessing the presence of RSs in learning tasks. Using rsbench, we highlight that obtaining high quality concepts in both purely neural and neuro-symbolic models is a far-from-solved problem. rsbench is available at: https://unitn-sml.github.io/rsbench.

Medical Multimodal Large Language Models (Med-MLLMs) require egocentric clinical intent understanding for real-world deployment, yet existing benchmarks fail to evaluate this critical capability. To address these challenges, we introduce MedGaze-Bench, the first benchmark leveraging clinician gaze as a Cognitive Cursor to assess intent understanding across surgery, emergency simulation, and diagnostic interpretation. Our benchmark addresses three fundamental challenges: visual homogeneity of anatomical structures, strict temporal-causal dependencies in clinical workflows, and implicit adherence to safety protocols. We propose a Three-Dimensional Clinical Intent Framework evaluating: (1) Spatial Intent: discriminating precise targets amid visual noise, (2) Temporal Intent: inferring causal rationale through retrospective and prospective reasoning, and (3) Standard Intent: verifying protocol compliance through safety checks. Beyond accuracy metrics, we introduce Trap QA mechanisms to stress-test clinical reliability by penalizing hallucinations and cognitive sycophancy. Experiments reveal current MLLMs struggle with egocentric intent due to over-reliance on global features, leading to fabricated observations and uncritical acceptance of invalid instructions.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that rely on system prompts to use tools and complete tasks. Such deployments impose distinct operational requirements, including appropriate tool use, concise prompts and solution paths, and compliance with safety and formatting policies. For many practitioners, however, assembling domain-specific supervised data to post-train models to meet these requirements is infeasible. We introduce CAPO (Constraint-Aware Prompt Optimization), a primal-dual method that combines pool-based rewrites with adaptive constraint weighting to optimize system prompts under explicit operational constraints. Across agentic benchmarks, CAPO more reliably reaches empirically feasible operating points while improving task performance. CAPO also generalizes beyond agentic settings, achieving strong results on assistant-style evaluations with output-format and safety/privacy constraints. We further introduce DCAPO (Dynamically Trained CAPO), which trains a feedback- and dual-conditioned rewriter with pool-based GRPO while keeping the task agent frozen. Across task agents of different sizes, DCAPO produces a feasible prompt in every evaluated domain and matches or improves the task accuracy achieved by the evaluated baselines. A surrogate analysis characterizes how finite-pool and discrete-rewrite errors enter the inexact primal-dual procedure.

While Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have revolutionized autonomous driving by unifying perception and planning, their reliance on explicit textual Chain-of-Thought (CoT) leads to semantic-perceptual decoupling and perceptual-symbolic conflicts. Recent shifts toward latent reasoning attempt to bypass these bottlenecks by thinking in continuous hidden space. However, without explicit intermediate constraints, standard latent CoT often operates as a physics-agnostic representation. To address this, we propose the Latent Spatio-Temporal VLA (LaST-VLA), a framework shifting the reasoning paradigm from discrete symbolic processing into a physically grounded Latent Spatio-Temporal CoT. By implementing a dual-feature alignment mechanism, we distill geometric constraints from 3D foundation models and dynamic foresight from world models directly into the latent space. Coupled with a progressive SFT training strategy that transitions from feature alignment to trajectory generation, and refined via Reinforcement Learning with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to ensure safety and rule compliance. \method~setting a new record on NAVSIM v1 (91.3 PDMS) and NAVSIM v2 (87.1 EPDMS), while excelling in spatial-temporal reasoning on SURDS and NuDynamics benchmarks.

Refusal rates are a poor proxy for LLM safety, i.e., a model may over-refuse benign prompts while still complying with harmful ones. We audit both failure modes across 21 open-weight LLMs on four safety benchmarks (OR-Bench, XSTest, ToxiGen, BOLD), using a composition adjustment to isolate model sensitivity from dataset toxicity confounds. We report three findings. First, models adopt fundamentally different calibration strategies: conservative ecosystems such as Llama suppress unsafe outputs at the cost of elevated over-refusals, while permissive ecosystems such as DeepSeek and Qwen preserve helpfulness but tolerate higher harmful compliance. Second, demographic protection is unequal: models over-protect prominent racial and religious groups, frequently refusing even benign prompts about them, while providing substantially weaker protection against disability-targeted attacks. Third, refusal and compliance tendencies are stable within model families across generations and scales, suggesting that post-training objectives shape safety behavior more than architecture. Our results call for joint, demographically-aware, and multi-judge safety evaluation.

Safety monitors screen prompts sent to deployed language models, flagging harmful requests so they are never answered. They are evaluated by recall against harmfulness labels, but a catch only prevents harm if the model would otherwise have complied. We measure the difference directly: we sample repeated responses from the target model, call a harmful prompt elicitable if the model complies at least once, and report monitor recall separately on elicitable and non-elicitable prompts. Across six monitor configurations and three model families, spanning activation probes, fine-tuned text guards, and a 120B policy-conditioned reasoning classifier, recall on elicitable prompts falls 0.22 to 0.38 below recall on non-elicitable prompts at a fixed false positive rate. The prompts a monitor misses are 2.8 to 5.6 times more likely to be complied with than the prompts it catches. The gap replicates across three model families and appears also in text-only monitors entirely independent of the target model. This suggests that standard recall may overstate the protection monitors provide in practice, and that monitors should be evaluated against what their models will actually answer.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

We present a suite of reinforcement learning environments illustrating various safety properties of intelligent agents. These problems include safe interruptibility, avoiding side effects, absent supervisor, reward gaming, safe exploration, as well as robustness to self-modification, distributional shift, and adversaries. To measure compliance with the intended safe behavior, we equip each environment with a performance function that is hidden from the agent. This allows us to categorize AI safety problems into robustness and specification problems, depending on whether the performance function corresponds to the observed reward function. We evaluate A2C and Rainbow, two recent deep reinforcement learning agents, on our environments and show that they are not able to solve them satisfactorily.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in healthcare, yet ensuring their safety and trustworthiness remains a barrier to deployment. Conversational medical assistants must avoid unsafe compliance without over-refusing benign queries. We present an iterative post-deployment alignment framework that applies Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to refine models against domain-specific safety signals. Using the CARES-18K benchmark for adversarial robustness, we evaluate four LLMs (Llama-3B/8B, Meditron-8B, Mistral-7B) across multiple cycles. Our results show up to 42% improvement in safety-related metrics for harmful query detection, alongside interesting trade-offs against erroneous refusals, thereby exposing architecture-dependent calibration biases. We also perform ablation studies to identify when self-evaluation is reliable and when external or finetuned judges are necessary to maximize performance gains. Our findings underscore the importance of adopting best practices that balance patient safety, user trust, and clinical utility in the design of conversational medical assistants.

The design of safety-critical agents based on large language models (LLMs) requires more than simple prompt engineering. This paper presents a comprehensive information-theoretic analysis of how rule encodings in system prompts influence attention mechanisms and compliance behaviour. We demonstrate that rule formats with low syntactic entropy and highly concentrated anchors reduce attention entropy and improve pointer fidelity, but reveal a fundamental trade-off between anchor redundancy and attention entropy that previous work failed to recognize. Through formal analysis of multiple attention architectures including causal, bidirectional, local sparse, kernelized, and cross-attention mechanisms, we establish bounds on pointer fidelity and show how anchor placement strategies must account for competing fidelity and entropy objectives. Combining these insights with a dynamic rule verification architecture, we provide a formal proof that hot reloading of verified rule sets increases the asymptotic probability of compliant outputs. These findings underscore the necessity of principled anchor design and dual enforcement mechanisms to protect LLM-based agents against prompt injection attacks while maintaining compliance in evolving domains.

Safety post-training can improve the harmfulness and policy compliance of Large Language Models (LLMs), but it may also reduce general utility, a phenomenon often described as the alignment tax. We study this trade-off through the lens of continual learning: sequential alignment stages expose the model to shifted data distributions and objectives, and their gradients may interfere with directions that support previously acquired general capabilities. This view does not claim that all alignment degradation has a single cause; rather, it provides a useful first-order mechanism for mitigating one important source of capability regression. We propose Orthogonal Gradient Projection for Safety Alignment (OGPSA), a lightweight update rule that estimates a low-rank reference subspace from gradients on a small set of general-capability data and removes from each safety gradient the component lying in this subspace. The resulting update is the steepest local safety-descent direction subject to first-order preservation constraints on the reference objectives. OGPSA is compatible with standard post-training pipelines and avoids large-scale replay, although it introduces periodic reference-gradient computation. Across Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and sequential SFTrightarrowDPO settings, OGPSA improves the observed safety--utility trade-off over standard baselines. Under the sequential SFTrightarrowDPO pipeline, the average performance gain increases from 33.98\% to 42.74\% on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct and from 19.74\% to 32.98\% on Llama3.1-8B-Instruct. We have open sourced our code at https://github.com/SunGL001/OGPSA.

Latent communication enables multi-agent systems to exchange information directly in internal representation space, reducing the token, computation, and latency overhead of text-based communication. To this end, lightweight trainable links are introduced to map the sender's representations into the receiver's input space. In this work, we show that even benign link training can increase harmful compliance relative to text-based communication while the underlying safety-aligned agents remain unchanged. An attacker can amplify this effect by optimizing the links on harmful query--response pairs or poisoning otherwise benign training data. We further develop a reinforcement-learning attack that rewards harmful compliance alongside benign task performance without requiring harmful target responses. Across three communication topologies and four safety benchmarks, this attack raises the mean harmful-compliance score from 27.9 with benignly trained links to 76.9. Compared with direct supervised optimization, it also achieves higher average accuracy on two benign utility benchmarks. Adapting the rewards toward safer behavior also enables repair of compromised links, substantially reducing harmful compliance across all evaluated attacks without updating the agents. Overall, our results show that safety alignment requires considering the multi-agent system as a whole.

Despite extensive safety alignment, large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Existing optimization-based attacks share a single objective: maximize a token-level proxy of victim compliance---such as the likelihood of an affirmative prefix---computed on the prompt rather than the decoded reply. This proxy cannot distinguish a cautious hedge from a fully actionable harmful answer, leaving the search blind to what the model actually says. We propose ECHO (Evaluation-Conditioned Harmfulness Optimization), which replaces the compliance proxy with response-level, continuous harmfulness scores from HarmSig, a 1.7B regressor grounded in actual harmful capability. ECHO couples HarmSig with five word-level perturbation operators and Keyword-Anchored Beam Search with global top-m memory, under a strict black-box threat model. Across five open-weight victims on AdvBench, ECHO achieves up to 0.898 StrongREJECT mean score and 89.23% HarmBench success. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/STANWYW/echo.

Open-weight language models can be rendered unsafe through several parameter-level interventions, yet models with matched harmful compliance can exhibit fundamentally different failure modes. We compare harmful supervised fine-tuning (SFT), harmful reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), and refusal-feature abliteration in Qwen2.5-7B and Llama-3.1-8B using harmfulness, capability, self-audit, safety reflection, representation similarity, and refusal-direction repair. All three routes reach near-ceiling harmfulness, but SFT causes the broadest capability loss and representational drift; abliteration yields localized, family-dependent refusal-feature suppression; and RLVR largely preserves base-model capability, explicit safety judgments, and representation geometry while retargeting behavior toward compliance. RLVR models consequently remain unusually responsive to safety-reflection prompts despite complying under direct prompting. We further find that harmful RLVR induces capability-blind compliance: models claim to complete unavailable actions and fabricate information about nonexistent entities. Targeted RLVR calibration substantially reduces this false acceptance without restoring safety or degrading general capability. These results show that harmful compliance, harm recognition, and capability awareness are separable behavioral axes, and that self-audit and hallucination patterns are not necessarily robust safety signals under adaptive post-training.

Safety-aligned language models often refuse prompts that are actually harmless. Current evaluations mostly report global rates such as false rejection or compliance. These scores treat each prompt alone and miss local inconsistency, where a model accepts one phrasing of an intent but rejects a close paraphrase. This gap limits diagnosis and tuning. We introduce "semantic confusion," a failure mode that captures such local inconsistency, and a framework to measure it. We build ParaGuard, a 10k-prompt corpus of controlled paraphrase clusters that hold intent fixed while varying surface form. We then propose three model-agnostic metrics at the token level: Confusion Index, Confusion Rate, and Confusion Depth. These metrics compare each refusal to its nearest accepted neighbors and use token embeddings, next-token probabilities, and perplexity signals. Experiments across diverse model families and deployment guards show that global false-rejection rate hides critical structure. Our metrics reveal globally unstable boundaries in some settings, localized pockets of inconsistency in others, and cases where stricter refusal does not increase inconsistency. We also show how confusion-aware auditing separates how often a system refuses from how sensibly it refuses. This gives developers a practical signal to reduce false refusals while preserving safety.

Large language models enable agents to autonomously perform tasks in open web environments. However, as hidden threats within the web evolve, web agents face the challenge of balancing task performance with emerging risks during long-sequence operations. Although this challenge is critical, current research remains limited to single-objective optimization or single-turn scenarios, lacking the capability for collaborative optimization of both safety and utility in web environments. To address this gap, we propose HarmonyGuard, a multi-agent collaborative framework that leverages policy enhancement and objective optimization to jointly improve both utility and safety. HarmonyGuard features a multi-agent architecture characterized by two fundamental capabilities: (1) Adaptive Policy Enhancement: We introduce the Policy Agent within HarmonyGuard, which automatically extracts and maintains structured security policies from unstructured external documents, while continuously updating policies in response to evolving threats. (2) Dual-Objective Optimization: Based on the dual objectives of safety and utility, the Utility Agent integrated within HarmonyGuard performs the Markovian real-time reasoning to evaluate the objectives and utilizes metacognitive capabilities for their optimization. Extensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that HarmonyGuard improves policy compliance by up to 38% and task completion by up to 20% over existing baselines, while achieving over 90% policy compliance across all tasks. Our project is available here: https://github.com/YurunChen/HarmonyGuard.

Safety alignment often improves robustness to harmful queries at the cost of reasoning ability, a tradeoff known as the safety tax. A common cause is distributional mismatch: supervised fine-tuning trains the target model on safety demonstrations produced by humans, external models, or fixed self-generated traces, rather than on trajectories sampled from its own policy. We identify off-policy training mismatch as a second source of this tax and study on-policy self-distillation for safety alignment, which we call OPSA. The model generates its own rollouts and receives dense per-token KL supervision from a frozen teacher copy of itself conditioned on a privileged safety context. Because this teacher must be safer than the sampled student trajectory, we introduce teacher flip rate: a criterion that measures how often a privileged context converts unsafe responses into safe ones. We use this signal to search for contexts that activate latent safety reasoning rather than merely elicit safe-looking demonstrations. Across two reasoning-model families and five model scales, OPSA achieves a stronger safety--reasoning tradeoff than off-policy self-distillation and external-teacher distillation under matched data and full-parameter fine-tuning, with the largest gains on smaller models (+8.85 points on R1-Distill-1.5B and +5.49 points on Qwen3-0.6B). The gains persist across training-set sizes and adaptive jailbreak evaluations. Token-level analyses further show that OPSA concentrates updates near early compliance-decision tokens, providing a mechanism for improving safety while preserving general reasoning.

Safety alignment in large language models remains brittle across languages: prompts reliably refused in English can elicit harmful compliance in non-English and low-resource settings. We introduce Minionese, a multilingual jailbreak benchmark spanning 18 languages, 4 resource tiers, and 4 perturbation types (standard translation, code-switching, transliteration, and translationese), paired with a geometric mechanistic analysis of refusal failure across language tiers. We show that each attack type produces a distinct vulnerability profile: transliteration vulnerability is mediated by script identity, code-switching maintains effectiveness through the lowest-resource tier, and a sharp safety regime transition between Tiers 2 and 3 is consistent across all models. Mechanistically, low-resource jailbreaks succeed by routing harmful content through a geometrically misaligned subspace that projects insufficiently onto the refusal directions, leaving the refusal mechanism intact but untriggered. These findings show that English-only safety evaluations are insufficient; they require accounting for script family, perturbation type, and per-language alignment coverage. The benchmark and analysis code is at https://github.com/Brentkong/Minionese-Comprehensive-Benchmark-and-Mechanistic-Study-of-Multilingual-LLM-Safety.git.

Laboratory accidents pose significant risks to human life and property, underscoring the importance of robust safety protocols. Despite advancements in safety training, laboratory personnel may still unknowingly engage in unsafe practices. With the increasing reliance on large language models (LLMs) for guidance in various fields, including laboratory settings, there is a growing concern about their reliability in critical safety-related decision-making. Unlike trained human researchers, LLMs lack formal lab safety education, raising questions about their ability to provide safe and accurate guidance. Existing research on LLM trustworthiness primarily focuses on issues such as ethical compliance, truthfulness, and fairness but fails to fully cover safety-critical real-world applications, like lab safety. To address this gap, we propose the Laboratory Safety Benchmark (LabSafety Bench), a comprehensive evaluation framework based on a new taxonomy aligned with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) protocols. This benchmark includes 765 multiple-choice questions verified by human experts, assessing LLMs and vision language models (VLMs) performance in lab safety contexts. Our evaluations demonstrate that while GPT-4o outperforms human participants, it is still prone to critical errors, highlighting the risks of relying on LLMs in safety-critical environments. Our findings emphasize the need for specialized benchmarks to accurately assess the trustworthiness of LLMs in real-world safety applications.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models is critical for healthcare; however, reliance on binary refusal boundaries often results in over-refusal of benign queries or unsafe compliance with harmful ones. While existing benchmarks measure these extremes, they fail to evaluate Safe Completion: the model's ability to maximise helpfulness on dual-use or borderline queries by providing safe, high-level guidance without crossing into actionable harm. We introduce Health-ORSC-Bench, the first large-scale benchmark designed to systematically measure Over-Refusal and Safe Completion quality in healthcare. Comprising 31,920 benign boundary prompts across seven health categories (e.g., self-harm, medical misinformation), our framework uses an automated pipeline with human validation to test models at varying levels of intent ambiguity. We evaluate 30 state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-5 and Claude-4, revealing a significant tension: safety-optimised models frequently refuse up to 80\% of "Hard" benign prompts, while domain-specific models often sacrifice safety for utility. Our findings demonstrate that model family and size significantly influence calibration: larger frontier models (e.g., GPT-5, Llama-4) exhibit "safety-pessimism" and higher over-refusal than smaller or MoE-based counterparts (e.g., Qwen-3-Next), highlighting that current LLMs struggle to balance refusal and compliance. Health-ORSC-Bench provides a rigorous standard for calibrating the next generation of medical AI assistants toward nuanced, safe, and helpful completions. The code and data will be released upon acceptance. red{Warning: Some contents may include toxic or undesired contents.}

Robotic chemists promise to both liberate human experts from repetitive tasks and accelerate scientific discovery, yet remain in their infancy. Chemical experiments involve long-horizon procedures over hazardous and deformable substances, where success requires not only task completion but also strict compliance with experimental norms. To address these challenges, we propose RoboChemist, a dual-loop framework that integrates Vision-Language Models (VLMs) with Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models. Unlike prior VLM-based systems (e.g., VoxPoser, ReKep) that rely on depth perception and struggle with transparent labware, and existing VLA systems (e.g., RDT, pi0) that lack semantic-level feedback for complex tasks, our method leverages a VLM to serve as (1) a planner to decompose tasks into primitive actions, (2) a visual prompt generator to guide VLA models, and (3) a monitor to assess task success and regulatory compliance. Notably, we introduce a VLA interface that accepts image-based visual targets from the VLM, enabling precise, goal-conditioned control. Our system successfully executes both primitive actions and complete multi-step chemistry protocols. Results show 23.57% higher average success rate and a 0.298 average increase in compliance rate over state-of-the-art VLA baselines, while also demonstrating strong generalization to objects and tasks.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in financial services, a single non-compliant interaction can expose institutions to regulatory penalties and direct consumer harm. Existing guard models are built around general harm taxonomies and overlook violations grounded in specific financial regulations. We address this gap with a regulation-driven pipeline that operates directly on regulatory documents, inducing a financial compliance risk taxonomy and synthesizing grounded training data without any predefined violation categories. Instantiating the pipeline on Chinese financial regulations, we release FinGuard-Bench, to our knowledge the first benchmark for financial regulatory compliance detection, with expert-annotated labels at both the query and response levels. We further train FinGuard, a financial compliance detection model built on Qwen3-8B and trained on the regulation-grounded data via supervised fine-tuning and self-play reinforcement learning. On FinGuard-Bench, FinGuard substantially outperforms all baselines, including dedicated guard models and much larger general-purpose LLMs such as Qwen3.5-397B-A17B and GPT-5.1. Furthermore, FinGuard also preserves general safety capabilities and adapts to unseen institution-specific policies using policy documents alone. We will publicly release the code, prompts, and resources used in this work on GitHub.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

Financial agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for investment analysis, risk assessment, and automated decision-making, where their abilities to plan, invoke tools, and manipulate mutable state introduce new security risks in high-stakes and highly regulated financial environments. However, existing safety evaluations largely focus on language-model-level content compliance or abstract agent settings, failing to capture execution-grounded risks arising from real operational workflows and state-changing actions. To bridge this gap, we propose FinVault, the first execution-grounded security benchmark for financial agents, comprising 31 regulatory case-driven sandbox scenarios with state-writable databases and explicit compliance constraints, together with 107 real-world vulnerabilities and 963 test cases that systematically cover prompt injection, jailbreaking, financially adapted attacks, as well as benign inputs for false-positive evaluation. Experimental results reveal that existing defense mechanisms remain ineffective in realistic financial agent settings, with average attack success rates (ASR) still reaching up to 50.0\% on state-of-the-art models and remaining non-negligible even for the most robust systems (ASR 6.7\%), highlighting the limited transferability of current safety designs and the need for stronger financial-specific defenses. Our code can be found at https://github.com/aifinlab/FinVault.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has produced substantial gains in reasoning, perception, and generative capability across language and vision. However, whether these advances yield commensurate improvements in safety remains unclear, in part due to fragmented evaluation practices limited to single modalities or threat models. In this report, we present an integrated safety evaluation of 7 frontier models: GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro, Qwen3-VL, Doubao 1.8, Grok 4.1 Fast, Nano Banana Pro, and Seedream 4.5. We evaluate each model across language, vision-language, and image generation settings using a unified protocol that integrates benchmark evaluation, adversarial evaluation, multilingual evaluation, and compliance evaluation. Aggregating our evaluations into safety leaderboards and model safety profiles across multiple evaluation modes reveals a sharply heterogeneous safety landscape. While GPT-5.2 demonstrates consistently strong and balanced safety performance across evaluations, other models exhibit pronounced trade-offs among benchmark safety, adversarial alignment, multilingual generalization, and regulatory compliance. Both language and vision-language modalities show significant vulnerability under adversarial evaluation, with all models degrading substantially despite strong results on standard benchmarks. Text-to-image models achieve relatively stronger alignment in regulated visual risk categories, yet remain brittle under adversarial or semantically ambiguous prompts. Overall, these results show that safety in frontier models is inherently multidimensional--shaped by modality, language, and evaluation scheme, underscoring the need for standardized safety evaluations to accurately assess real-world risk and guide responsible model development and deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in cost-sensitive and on-device scenarios, and safety guardrails have advanced mainly in English. However, real-world Chinese malicious queries typically conceal intent via homophones, pinyin, symbol-based splitting, and other Chinese-specific patterns. These Chinese-specific adversarial patterns create the safety evaluation gap that is not well captured by existing benchmarks focused on English. This gap is particularly concerning for lightweight models, which may be more vulnerable to such specific adversarial perturbations. To bridge this gap, we introduce the Chinese-Specific Safety Benchmark (CSSBench) that emphasizes these adversarial patterns and evaluates the safety of lightweight LLMs in Chinese. Our benchmark covers six domains that are common in real Chinese scenarios, including illegal activities and compliance, privacy leakage, health and medical misinformation, fraud and hate, adult content, and public and political safety, and organizes queries into multiple task types. We evaluate a set of popular lightweight LLMs and measure over-refusal behavior to assess safety-induced performance degradation. Our results show that the Chinese-specific adversarial pattern is a critical challenge for lightweight LLMs. This benchmark offers a comprehensive evaluation of LLM safety in Chinese, assisting robust deployments in practice.

Safety evaluation and red-teaming of large language models remain predominantly text-centric, and existing frameworks lack the infrastructure to systematically test whether alignment generalizes to audio, image, and video inputs. We present MUSE (Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation), an open-source, run-centric platform that integrates automatic cross-modal payload generation, three multi-turn attack algorithms (Crescendo, PAIR, Violent Durian), provider-agnostic model routing, and an LLM judge with a five-level safety taxonomy into a single browser-based system. A dual-metric framework distinguishes hard Attack Success Rate (Compliance only) from soft ASR (including Partial Compliance), capturing partial information leakage that binary metrics miss. To probe whether alignment generalizes across modality boundaries, we introduce Inter-Turn Modality Switching (ITMS), which augments multi-turn attacks with per-turn modality rotation. Experiments across six multimodal LLMs from four providers show that multi-turn strategies can achieve up to 90-100% ASR against models with near-perfect single-turn refusal. ITMS does not uniformly raise final ASR on already-saturated baselines, but accelerates convergence by destabilizing early-turn defenses, and ablation reveals that the direction of modality effects is model-family-specific rather than universal, underscoring the need for provider-aware cross-modal safety testing.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) increasingly expose chain-of-thought-like reasoning for transparency, verification, and deliberate problem solving. This creates a safety blind spot: harmful or policy-violating content may appear in reasoning traces even when final answers appear safe. We test whether final-answer safety is a sufficient proxy for the full reasoning-answer trajectory by scoring both stages under a unified twenty-principle safety rubric. Using prompts from seven public harmfulness and jailbreak sources, plus four out-of-distribution (OOD) sources, we evaluate 15 open-weight and API-based LRMs across 41K prompts per model. Reasoning traces consistently reveal additional safety risks beyond final answers, especially in high-severity stage-wise failures: leak cases, where unsafe reasoning precedes a safe-looking answer, and escape cases, where benign-looking reasoning precedes an unsafe final response. Principle-level analysis shows that risk concentrates in misinformation, legal compliance, discrimination, physical harm, and psychological harm. We further propose adaptive multi-principle steering, a white-box test-time mitigation that learns one unsafe-to-safe activation direction per safety principle and activates only directions whose current hidden state is closer to the unsafe than safe centroid. On three steerable open reasoning models, adaptive steering reduces unsafe counts in both reasoning traces and final answers on held-out and OOD benchmarks. DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-7B achieves a 40.8% average unsafe-count reduction while retaining 97.7% macro-averaged accuracy on BBH, GSM8K, and MMLU. These results suggest that LRM safety should be evaluated and mitigated over the full exposed reasoning-answer trajectory, not only at the final-answer stage.

As embodied AI transitions to real-world deployment, the success of the Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) task tends to evolve from mere reachability to social compliance. However, current agents suffer from a "goal-driven trap", prioritizing physical geometry ("can I go?") over semantic rules ("may I go?"), frequently overlooking subtle regulatory constraints. To bridge this gap, we establish Rule-VLN, the first large-scale urban benchmark for rule-compliant navigation. Spanning a massive 29k-node environment, it injects 177 diverse regulatory categories into 8k constrained nodes across four curriculum levels, challenging agents with fine-grained visual and behavioral constraints. We further propose the Semantic Navigation Rectification Module (SNRM), a universal, zero-shot module designed to equip pre-trained agents with safety awareness. SNRM integrates a coarse-to-fine visual perception VLM framework with an epistemic mental map for dynamic detour planning. Experiments demonstrate that while Rule-VLN challenges state-of-the-art models, SNRM significantly restores navigation capabilities, reducing CVR by 19.26% and boosting TC by 5.97%.

Tool-using LLM agents are usually evaluated by final-answer correctness or LLM judges. Neither captures how an answer was produced. In safety-critical settings, the procedure itself is part of correctness. In this paper, we introduce AgentLTL, a language derived from First-Order Linear Temporal Logic (FO-LTL) that expresses procedural rules over agent traces. It yields a deterministic, judge-free compliance score. In this framework, a single specification drives two usages. The first is harnessing: the constraints score completed traces, or gate tool calls by checking each prefix online, before execution. The second is finetuning: the score serves as a dense reward. On a benchmark spanning ordering, branching, iteration, and grounding, block-and-warn harnessing improves compliance on five of seven models. Finetuning with the same reward yields +38 and +17.5 percentage point gains in accuracy and compliance on held-out patterns, including unseen tool-name aliases. These findings are consistent with the model acquiring procedural structure rather than memorizing surface tool names and procedures.

Small Language Models (SLMs) are increasingly deployed in resource-constrained, privacy-sensitive settings, where safety and bias failures can cause security and societal risks. However, existing AI safety\slash security\slash compliance benchmarks are designed for large language models that may not transfer reliably to SLMs. We therefore ask: Can these benchmarks effectively and reliably evaluate SLMs? To answer this question, we conduct a large-scale assessment of the effectiveness and robustness of these automated pipelines by evaluating five widely used benchmark suites across 26 open-source SLMs under a unified judging rubric, which assigns a score of 0, 1, or 0.5 to harmful, safe, or ambiguous/irrelevant responses, respectively. Across the benchmarks, ambiguous judgments dominate and correlate with prompt complexity and model architecture, indicating that {\em LLM-centric safety benchmarks are insufficient as standalone evidence for SLM safety assessment}. In general, the ambiguity rate increases with lexical density, output perplexity, and output length and decreases with lexical sophistication, self-coherence, and reply-prompt similarity. This reveals a capability-safety confound that mixes model capability with apparent safety. Since ambiguity is prevalent, aggregate mean-score leaderboards are mathematically brittle: model rankings change significantly under reasonable ambiguity treatments, even when the underlying outputs remain unchanged.

Alignment in large language models (LLMs) is used to enforce guidelines such as safety. Yet, alignment fails in the face of jailbreak attacks that modify inputs to induce unsafe outputs. In this paper, we present and evaluate a method to assess the robustness of LLM alignment. We observe that alignment embeds a safety classifier in the target model that is responsible for deciding between refusal and compliance. We seek to extract an approximation of this classifier, called a surrogate classifier, from the LLM. We develop an algorithm for identifying candidate classifiers from subsets of the LLM model. We evaluate the degree to which the candidate classifiers approximate the model's embedded classifier in benign (F1 score) and adversarial (using surrogates in a white-box attack) settings. Our evaluation shows that the best candidates achieve accurate agreement (an F1 score above 80%) using as little as 20% of the model architecture. Further, we find attacks mounted on the surrogate models can be transferred with high accuracy. For example, a surrogate using only 50% of the Llama 2 model achieved an attack success rate (ASR) of 70%, a substantial improvement over attacking the LLM directly, where we only observed a 22% ASR. These results show that extracting surrogate classifiers is a viable (and highly effective) means for modeling (and therein addressing) the vulnerability of aligned models to jailbreaking attacks.

Arabic large language models must refuse harmful prompts without over-refusing benign or sensitive prompts, yet a single refusal rate hides this trade-off. We evaluate it using benign refusal B and harmful-prompt refusal H, where H measures refusal rather than harmful compliance. Across five Arabic-capable models and 130 runs on the full human-written AraSafe set, refusal-only supervised fine-tuning (SFT) collapses toward blanket refusal, whereas selected mixed-SFT configurations reach H = 90% to 93% at B = 14% to 23%; four selected configurations exceed the H = 90% target in all three runs, while Fanar does so in two of three. Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and inference guards change B and H differently across models rather than acting as uniform upgrades. In a blinded 300-response audit, annotator binary-refusal agreement is 89.0% (kappa = 0.78); Qwen3Guard and Aya Expanse 32B reach 88.7% and 91.0% accuracy, respectively, with no conclusive paired difference. Selected SFT raises H on Arabizi for all five models, but none reaches 90%, showing only partial transfer from Modern Standard Arabic. Overall, the results support model-specific operating-point selection: set a deployment target and retain only interventions that improve it.

This study addresses a critical gap in safety tuning practices for Large Language Models (LLMs) by identifying and tackling a refusal position bias within safety tuning data, which compromises the models' ability to appropriately refuse generating unsafe content. We introduce a novel approach, Decoupled Refusal Training (DeRTa), designed to empower LLMs to refuse compliance to harmful prompts at any response position, significantly enhancing their safety capabilities. DeRTa incorporates two novel components: (1) Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with Harmful Response Prefix, which trains models to recognize and avoid unsafe content by appending a segment of harmful response to the beginning of a safe response, and (2) Reinforced Transition Optimization (RTO), which equips models with the ability to transition from potential harm to safety refusal consistently throughout the harmful response sequence. Our empirical evaluation, conducted using LLaMA3 and Mistral model families across six attack scenarios, demonstrates that our method not only improves model safety without compromising performance but also surpasses well-known models such as GPT-4 in defending against attacks. Importantly, our approach successfully defends recent advanced attack methods (e.g., CodeAttack) that have jailbroken GPT-4 and LLaMA3-70B-Instruct. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/RobustNLP/DeRTa.

Large Language Models (LLMs) face threats from jailbreak prompts. Existing methods for detecting jailbreak prompts are primarily online moderation APIs or finetuned LLMs. These strategies, however, often require extensive and resource-intensive data collection and training processes. In this study, we propose GradSafe, which effectively detects jailbreak prompts by scrutinizing the gradients of safety-critical parameters in LLMs. Our method is grounded in a pivotal observation: the gradients of an LLM's loss for jailbreak prompts paired with compliance response exhibit similar patterns on certain safety-critical parameters. In contrast, safe prompts lead to different gradient patterns. Building on this observation, GradSafe analyzes the gradients from prompts (paired with compliance responses) to accurately detect jailbreak prompts. We show that GradSafe, applied to Llama-2 without further training, outperforms Llama Guard, despite its extensive finetuning with a large dataset, in detecting jailbreak prompts. This superior performance is consistent across both zero-shot and adaptation scenarios, as evidenced by our evaluations on ToxicChat and XSTest. The source code is available at https://github.com/xyq7/GradSafe.

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly proficient at solving web-based tasks. With this capability comes a greater risk of misuse for malicious purposes, such as posting misinformation in an online forum or selling illicit substances on a website. To evaluate these risks, we propose SafeArena, the first benchmark to focus on the deliberate misuse of web agents. SafeArena comprises 250 safe and 250 harmful tasks across four websites. We classify the harmful tasks into five harm categories -- misinformation, illegal activity, harassment, cybercrime, and social bias, designed to assess realistic misuses of web agents. We evaluate leading LLM-based web agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, Qwen-2-VL 72B, and Llama-3.2 90B, on our benchmark. To systematically assess their susceptibility to harmful tasks, we introduce the Agent Risk Assessment framework that categorizes agent behavior across four risk levels. We find agents are surprisingly compliant with malicious requests, with GPT-4o and Qwen-2 completing 34.7% and 27.3% of harmful requests, respectively. Our findings highlight the urgent need for safety alignment procedures for web agents. Our benchmark is available here: https://safearena.github.io

End-to-end autonomous driving, where the entire driving pipeline is replaced with a single neural network, has recently gained research attention because of its simpler structure and faster inference time. Despite this appealing approach largely reducing the complexity in the driving pipeline, it also leads to safety issues because the trained policy is not always compliant with the traffic rules. In this paper, we proposed P-CSG, a penalty-based imitation learning approach with contrastive-based cross semantics generation sensor fusion technologies to increase the overall performance of end-to-end autonomous driving. In this method, we introduce three penalties - red light, stop sign, and curvature speed penalty to make the agent more sensitive to traffic rules. The proposed cross semantics generation helps to align the shared information of different input modalities. We assessed our model's performance using the CARLA Leaderboard - Town 05 Long Benchmark and Longest6 Benchmark, achieving 8.5% and 2.0% driving score improvement compared to the baselines. Furthermore, we conducted robustness evaluations against adversarial attacks like FGSM and Dot attacks, revealing a substantial increase in robustness compared to other baseline models. More detailed information can be found at https://hk-zh.github.io/p-csg-plus.

LLM agents increasingly run inside execution harnesses that dispatch tools, allocate resources, and route messages between specialized components. However, a harness can return a correct, benign answer over a trajectory that accesses unauthorized resources or leaks context to the wrong agent. Output-level evaluation cannot see these failures, yet most safety benchmarks score only final outputs or terminal states, even though many violations occur mid-trajectory rather than at termination. The central question is whether the harness respects user intent, permission boundaries, and information-flow constraints throughout execution. To address this gap, we propose HarnessAudit, a framework that audits full execution trajectories across boundary compliance, execution fidelity, and system stability, with a focus on multi-agent harnesses where these risks are most pronounced. We further introduce HarnessAudit-Bench, a benchmark of 210 tasks across eight real-world domains, instantiated in both single-agent and multi-agent configurations with embedded safety constraints. Evaluating ten harness configurations across frontier models and three multi-agent frameworks, we find that: (i) task completion is misaligned with safe execution, and violations accumulate with trajectory length; (ii) safety risks vary across domains, task types, and agent roles; (iii) most violations concentrate in resource access and inter-agent information transfer; and (iv) multi-agent collaboration expands the safety risk surface, while harness design sets the upper bound of safe deployment.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve widespread integration across diverse linguistic landscapes, ensuring their safety and alignment with regional normative values remains a critical challenge. Current safety mechanisms are predominantly optimized for English-centric frameworks, often failing to capture the unique socio-cultural sensitivities and localized categories of harm inherent to the Indic region. To address this gap, we introduce IndicGuard, a multilingual safety guard model and dataset for Indic languages. We construct a high-volume, culturally nuanced safety dataset encompassing ten major Indic languages, systematically curated to capture regional harms, sensitive socio-political contexts, and adversarial jailbreaks. Leveraging this corpus, we fine-tune a 4B-parameter instruction-tuned model based on Gemma-3-4B-IT to serve as a multilingual safety guardrail for real-time content moderation and policy compliance checking. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate that IndicGuard significantly enhances LLM robustness against localized vulnerabilities, achieving high moderation consistency across different conversational turns. Crucially, IndicGuard consistently outperforms the existing baseline model, CultureGuard, across evaluated languages. Finally, we demonstrate that our model effectively generalizes to low-resource Indic languages excluded from training, substantiating the structural robustness and cross-lingual transfer capabilities of the framework.

Specifying a penalty can turn a legal obligation into a cost-benefit calculation that favors violation. We show that this enforcement information paradox occurs in AI agents. Most AI safety evaluations test whether models fail; we ask why, using compliance theory from law and economics as a diagnostic. We evaluate twelve instruction-tuned language models deployed as enterprise procurement chatbots. Each is given an environmental regulation in its system prompt covering large purchases, and a vendor list on which the certified suppliers cost nearly twice what the uncertified ones do. We test the agents against the predictions of deterrence, legitimacy, and expressive law, and find that each theory accounts for part of what we observe. Under identical conditions, compliance spans 46 percentage points across models, and models differ in which pressure breaks them: some treat the regulation as binding however it is worded, while others fail where theory predicts, under low penalties and non-command phrasing. Benchmark scores and developers' own descriptions of post-training do not predict where a model falls. Across all twelve, financial incentives, managerial demands, peer outcomes, and employee pressure each produce large compliance failures. These agents violate regulatory constraints to satisfy local user objectives in ways standard alignment benchmarks do not measure. Embedding the rule in the system prompt is not on its own enough to produce a compliant agent: model selection is itself a governance decision, and benchmark evaluation is not sufficient for compliance-sensitive deployments.

Mechanistic interpretability has emerged as the primary means to understand safety behavior of LLMs. However, existing tools primarily focus on the activating neurons or features of a model. The role of the remaining large set of inactive components is invisible to such methods. This work demonstrates that the inactive set contains safety-critical features that are causally relevant for refusal of harmful prompts. Suppressing such features could turn refusals into compliance, while passing undetected by prevalent interpretability tools. We introduce the Counterfactual Activation Potential (CAP), a metric that quantifies a suppressed feature's latent activation tendency as the product of its encoder alignment (how strongly the input drives it), suppression strength (how strongly active features inhibit it), and safety criticality (how much refusal depends on it). To find suppressed safety features at scale, we propose CAP-guided Safety Feature Discovery (CSFD), a two-stage filtering algorithm that identifies candidate safety features from hundreds of thousands of transcoder features without exhaustive ablation. A significant fraction of trials turn compliant with harmful prompts when a candidate feature is ablated. Under natural jailbreaks, the suppression acting on the highest-CAP features rises 2-4x, and their activation correspondingly falls by up to 80%. Amplifying a feature's suppressors pushes its activation down and raises harmful compliance with prompts related to the suppressed feature, with no such effect for random features. Our experiments span five Gemma, Qwen, and Llama models across various parameter sizes. Our findings indicate that jailbreaks could operate in part by suppressing safety-critical features rather than solely activating harmful ones, and that suppressed features are a necessary complement to activation-focused interpretability of safety behavior.

Safety-aligned language models often exhibit fragile and imbalanced safety mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of generating unsafe content. In addition, incorporating new knowledge through editing techniques to language models can further compromise safety. To address these issues, we propose SafeInfer, a context-adaptive, decoding-time safety alignment strategy for generating safe responses to user queries. SafeInfer comprises two phases: the safety amplification phase, which employs safe demonstration examples to adjust the model's hidden states and increase the likelihood of safer outputs, and the safety-guided decoding phase, which influences token selection based on safety-optimized distributions, ensuring the generated content complies with ethical guidelines. Further, we present HarmEval, a novel benchmark for extensive safety evaluations, designed to address potential misuse scenarios in accordance with the policies of leading AI tech giants.

We introduce WildGuard -- an open, light-weight moderation tool for LLM safety that achieves three goals: (1) identifying malicious intent in user prompts, (2) detecting safety risks of model responses, and (3) determining model refusal rate. Together, WildGuard serves the increasing needs for automatic safety moderation and evaluation of LLM interactions, providing a one-stop tool with enhanced accuracy and broad coverage across 13 risk categories. While existing open moderation tools such as Llama-Guard2 score reasonably well in classifying straightforward model interactions, they lag far behind a prompted GPT-4, especially in identifying adversarial jailbreaks and in evaluating models' refusals, a key measure for evaluating safety behaviors in model responses. To address these challenges, we construct WildGuardMix, a large-scale and carefully balanced multi-task safety moderation dataset with 92K labeled examples that cover vanilla (direct) prompts and adversarial jailbreaks, paired with various refusal and compliance responses. WildGuardMix is a combination of WildGuardTrain, the training data of WildGuard, and WildGuardTest, a high-quality human-annotated moderation test set with 5K labeled items covering broad risk scenarios. Through extensive evaluations on WildGuardTest and ten existing public benchmarks, we show that WildGuard establishes state-of-the-art performance in open-source safety moderation across all the three tasks compared to ten strong existing open-source moderation models (e.g., up to 26.4% improvement on refusal detection). Importantly, WildGuard matches and sometimes exceeds GPT-4 performance (e.g., up to 3.9% improvement on prompt harmfulness identification). WildGuard serves as a highly effective safety moderator in an LLM interface, reducing the success rate of jailbreak attacks from 79.8% to 2.4%.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex problem-solving through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, the multi-step nature of CoT introduces new safety challenges that extend beyond conventional language model alignment. We identify a failure mode in current safety CoT tuning methods: the snowball effect, where minor reasoning deviations progressively amplify throughout the thought process, leading to either harmful compliance or excessive refusal. This effect stems from models being trained to imitate perfect reasoning scripts without learning to self-correct. To address this limitation, we propose AdvChain, an alignment paradigm that teaches models dynamic self-correction through adversarial CoT tuning. Our method involves constructing a dataset containing Temptation-Correction and Hesitation-Correction samples, where models learn to recover from harmful reasoning drifts and unnecessary cautions. Extensive experiments show that AdvChain significantly enhances robustness against jailbreak attacks and CoT hijacking while substantially reducing over-refusal on benign prompts, achieving a superior safety-utility balance without compromising reasoning capabilities. Our work establishes a new direction for building more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

We investigate strategic deception in large language models using two complementary testbeds: Secret Agenda (across 38 models) and Insider Trading compliance (via SAE architectures). Secret Agenda reliably induced lying when deception advantaged goal achievement across all model families. Analysis revealed that autolabeled SAE features for "deception" rarely activated during strategic dishonesty, and feature steering experiments across 100+ deception-related features failed to prevent lying. Conversely, insider trading analysis using unlabeled SAE activations separated deceptive versus compliant responses through discriminative patterns in heatmaps and t-SNE visualizations. These findings suggest autolabel-driven interpretability approaches fail to detect or control behavioral deception, while aggregate unlabeled activations provide population-level structure for risk assessment. Results span Llama 8B/70B SAE implementations and GemmaScope under resource constraints, representing preliminary findings that motivate larger studies on feature discovery, labeling methodology, and causal interventions in realistic deception contexts.

Today's reasoning models use thinking tokens to attain stronger performance on benchmarks than their instruction-tuned counterparts. It is also generally believed that this more "deliberative" mode should improve alignment and safety, by providing the model a safe space to consider whether its planned answer to a request violates its safety principles. We present evidence that this intuition is not always correct. Across frontier open-weight reasoning models spanning GPT-OSS, Qwen, Olmo, and Phi families, we find that the eventual refusal/compliance outcome is already strongly predictable via a trained head on the first token's hidden representation (0.84-0.95 AUROC and sim88% balanced accuracy for predicting refusal/compliance) before any visible thinking. The thinking process turns out to be more akin to prefix completion than to deliberative revision, with the final outcome rarely changing after the first sim20% of thinking, despite giving the appearance of deliberation at the text level (sim74% of text-level deliberations occur when the response distribution is already locked to one refusal/compliance side). We also find that existing inference-time and training-based safety interventions, despite being motivated by the goal of inducing deliberation, largely shift model behavior toward over-refusal while suppressing already-scarce deliberation signals. Our results suggest that safety behavior in current reasoning models is much less deliberative than commonly assumed, and highlight the need for methods that induce real safety deliberation.

Workplace accidents continue to pose significant risks for human safety, particularly in industries such as construction and manufacturing, and the necessity for effective Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) compliance has become increasingly paramount. Our research focuses on the development of non-invasive techniques based on the Object Detection (OD) and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) to detect and verify the proper use of various types of PPE such as helmets, safety glasses, masks, and protective clothing. This study proposes the SH17 Dataset, consisting of 8,099 annotated images containing 75,994 instances of 17 classes collected from diverse industrial environments, to train and validate the OD models. We have trained state-of-the-art OD models for benchmarking, and initial results demonstrate promising accuracy levels with You Only Look Once (YOLO)v9-e model variant exceeding 70.9% in PPE detection. The performance of the model validation on cross-domain datasets suggests that integrating these technologies can significantly improve safety management systems, providing a scalable and efficient solution for industries striving to meet human safety regulations and protect their workforce. The dataset is available at https://github.com/ahmadmughees/sh17dataset.

Suppressing a small set of routed experts can weaken the safety behavior of a sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language model without retraining. Which experts to suppress is therefore a security question, and the usual answer is activation frequency, but frequency measures use, not influence. We test an alternative: router-gradient sensitivity, the sensitivity of the sequence loss to the gate weights that select an expert. Across five MoE architectures, we rank experts by each signal on 500 benign and 500 malicious prompts and measure refusal on 100 held-out malicious prompts under two budgets: equal expert counts and equal nominal malicious routing traffic (1%-5%). Under each of the two budgets, router-gradient selection reduces refusals more than activation in 24 of 25 conditions, and more than a ten-trial random mean in all 25. The largest effect is in OLMoE, where refusals fall from 34 to 9 of 100 prompts (73.53% relative) with no degraded outputs, indicating substantive compliance rather than broken generation. After matching expert counts in every layer, gradient selection still produces greater refusal reduction than activation in 23 of 25 conditions, with two ties. An exploratory cross-model analysis links larger malicious-versus-benign concentration gaps to greater peak gradient effects (rho = 0.90; exact two-sided p = 0.083, n = 5). Together, the results support gradient selection under the tested budgets.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.

Tool-using LLM agents fail through trajectories rather than only final responses, as they may execute unsafe tool calls, follow injected instructions, comply with harmful requests, or over-refuse benign tasks despite producing a seemingly safe answer. Existing safety-alignment signals are largely response-level or off-policy, and often incur a safety-utility trade-off: improving agent safety comes at the cost of degraded task performance. Such sparse and single-objective rewards severely limit real-world usability. To bridge this gap, we propose FATE, an on-policy self-evolving framework that transforms verifier-scored failures into repair supervision without expert demonstrations. For each failure, the same policy proposes repair candidates, which are then re-scored by verifiers and filtered across security, utility, over-refusal control, and trajectory validity. This dense trajectory-level information is then used as a supervision signal for agent self-evolution. During this process, we further introduce Pareto-Front Policy Optimization (PFPO), combining supervised warmup with Pareto-aware policy optimization to preserve safety-utility trade-offs. Experiments on AgentDojo, AgentHarm, and ATBench show that FATE improves safety across different models and scales while preserving useful behavior. Compared with strong baselines, FATE reduces attack success rate by 33.5%, harmful compliance by 82.6%, and improves external trajectory-safety diagnosis by 6.5%. These results suggest that failed trajectories can provide structured repair supervision for safer self-evolving agents.

Enterprise customers are increasingly adopting Large Language Models (LLMs) for critical communication tasks, such as drafting emails, crafting sales pitches, and composing casual messages. Deploying such models across different regions requires them to understand diverse cultural and linguistic contexts and generate safe and respectful responses. For enterprise applications, it is crucial to mitigate reputational risks, maintain trust, and ensure compliance by effectively identifying and handling unsafe or offensive language. To address this, we introduce SweEval, a benchmark simulating real-world scenarios with variations in tone (positive or negative) and context (formal or informal). The prompts explicitly instruct the model to include specific swear words while completing the task. This benchmark evaluates whether LLMs comply with or resist such inappropriate instructions and assesses their alignment with ethical frameworks, cultural nuances, and language comprehension capabilities. In order to advance research in building ethically aligned AI systems for enterprise use and beyond, we release the dataset and code: https://github.com/amitbcp/multilingual_profanity.

Recent advances in real-time interactive text-driven motion generation have enabled humanoids to perform diverse behaviors. However, kinematics-only generators often exhibit physical hallucinations, producing motion trajectories that are physically infeasible to track with a downstream motion tracking controller or unsafe for real-world deployment. These failures often arise from the lack of explicit physics-aware objectives for real-robot execution and become more severe under out-of-distribution (OOD) user inputs. Hence, we propose SafeFlow, a text-driven humanoid whole-body control framework that combines physics-guided motion generation with a 3-Stage Safety Gate driven by explicit risk indicators. SafeFlow adopts a two-level architecture. At the high level, we generate motion trajectories using Physics-Guided Rectified Flow Matching in a VAE latent space to improve real-robot executability, and further accelerate sampling via Reflow to reduce the number of function evaluations (NFE) for real-time control. The 3-Stage Safety Gate enables selective execution by detecting semantic OOD prompts using a Mahalanobis score in text-embedding space, filtering unstable generations via a directional sensitivity discrepancy metric, and enforcing final hard kinematic constraints such as joint and velocity limits before passing the generated trajectory to a low-level motion tracking controller. Extensive experiments on the Unitree G1 demonstrate that SafeFlow outperforms prior diffusion-based methods in success rate, physical compliance, and inference speed, while maintaining diverse expressiveness.

Safety tuning can improve harmful refusal, but models may learn surface-form shortcuts: wrapped harmful prompts bypass safety, while similarly wrapped benign prompts are over-refused. We propose Wrapper-Based Intent-Form Augmentation (WIFA), an automatic intent-group augmentation method that pairs wrapped harmful examples with structurally matched wrapped benign counterexamples, requiring no external teacher or manual per-wrapper intent labels. We use WIFA as a common data layer for two complementary fine-tuning routes: WIFA-Boost, a two-stage high-safety recipe, and Anchored Group-Consistent Refusal Training (A-GCRT), which regularizes refusal/compliance decision scores across same-intent wrappers and anchors harmful and benign groups on opposite sides of a margin. In the Qwen setting, WIFA-Boost reaches the strongest transformed-harmful refusal, while A-GCRT reduces OR-Bench over-refusal from 25.7\% for the base model to 17.4\%; reproduced baselines do not match these operating points. Llama results and ablations over data structure, two-stage order, and A-GCRT components support this intent-group interpretation without claiming universal below-base over-refusal.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in network operations (NetOps) and artificial intelligence for IT operations (AIOps) for tasks ranging from telemetry retrieval and incident diagnosis to configuration planning and bounded remediation. As these systems acquire greater access to operational tools, a central question is whether operational assurance develops commensurately with the authority granted to them. This survey examines that question through a structured, evidence-stratified review of agentic NetOps and AIOps, spanning directly evaluated LLM systems, operational mechanisms, transferred evidence, and normative guidance. We organise the field around autonomy, tool scope, evidence traces, assurance controls, evaluation, security, and governance, and introduce an operational assurance contract that links each autonomy level to permitted tools, required evidence, independent gates, execution budgets, rollout and rollback duties, and audit requirements. The synthesis indicates a capability-assurance gap: evidence is comparatively strong for read-oriented assistance and tool-grounded diagnosis, but becomes substantially less complete as systems approach configuration change, bounded execution, and closed-loop operation. We therefore develop a workflow-level evaluation framework covering evidence quality, tool use, policy and invariant compliance, staged execution, recovery, calibration, cost, and human intervention, together with a threat model for prompt-borne attacks, compromised operational evidence, excessive agency, privilege boundaries, and auditability. The resulting view treats agentic NetOps and AIOps as constrained operational control, in which increasing autonomy requires correspondingly stronger evidence, independently enforced safeguards, and recovery mechanisms.

Safety, security, and compliance are essential requirements when aligning large language models (LLMs). However, many seemingly aligned LLMs are soon shown to be susceptible to jailbreak attacks. These attacks aim to circumvent the models' safety guardrails and security mechanisms by introducing jailbreak prompts into malicious queries. In response to these challenges, this paper introduces Defensive Prompt Patch (DPP), a novel prompt-based defense mechanism specifically designed to protect LLMs against such sophisticated jailbreak strategies. Unlike previous approaches, which have often compromised the utility of the model for the sake of safety, DPP is designed to achieve a minimal Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the high utility of LLMs. Our method uses strategically designed interpretable suffix prompts that effectively thwart a wide range of standard and adaptive jailbreak techniques. Empirical results conducted on LLAMA-2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 models demonstrate the robustness and adaptability of DPP, showing significant reductions in ASR with negligible impact on utility. Our approach not only outperforms existing defense strategies in balancing safety and functionality, but also provides a scalable and interpretable solution applicable to various LLM platforms.

As autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes environments, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values has become a paramount concern. Current safety benchmarks primarily evaluate whether agents refuse explicitly harmful instructions or whether they can maintain procedural compliance in complex tasks. However, there is a lack of benchmarks designed to capture emergent forms of outcome-driven constraint violations, which arise when agents pursue goal optimization under strong performance incentives while deprioritizing ethical, legal, or safety constraints over multiple steps in realistic production settings. To address this gap, we introduce a new benchmark comprising 40 distinct scenarios. Each scenario presents a task that requires multi-step actions, and the agent's performance is tied to a specific Key Performance Indicator (KPI). Each scenario features Mandated (instruction-commanded) and Incentivized (KPI-pressure-driven) variations to distinguish between obedience and emergent misalignment. Across 12 state-of-the-art large language models, we observe outcome-driven constraint violations ranging from 1.3% to 71.4%, with 9 of the 12 evaluated models exhibiting misalignment rates between 30% and 50%. Strikingly, we find that superior reasoning capability does not inherently ensure safety; for instance, Gemini-3-Pro-Preview, one of the most capable models evaluated, exhibits the highest violation rate at 71.4%, frequently escalating to severe misconduct to satisfy KPIs. Furthermore, we observe significant "deliberative misalignment", where the models that power the agents recognize their actions as unethical during separate evaluation. These results emphasize the critical need for more realistic agentic-safety training before deployment to mitigate their risks in the real world.

Safety benchmarks assume that test-condition behavior predicts deployment behavior, an assumption that fails if models detect evaluation cues and adapt. This opens a gap between benchmark performance and deployment behavior: compliance measured under test conditions becomes an optimistic upper bound that overstates how safely a model behaves once the evaluation harness is removed. We characterize this evaluation awareness through eight experiments across 37 open-weight models and seven families. (i)Detection is moderate and training-driven (24/37 models exceed chance, best AUROC 0.714 vs.0.819 human, with instruction tuning dominating over scale). (ii)Detection shifts safety behavior (hard refusal drops 5.8 percentage points under hypothetical framing, and 21/140 HarmBench framing effects are significant, with compliance rising up to +30 percentage points. (iii)Representations survive behavioral collapse (probes retain AUROC 0.98 under rewrites that drive behavior below chance, and multi-layer steering causally moves three downstream tasks while random controls do not). (iv)These axes are weakly coupled (only 1/15 correlations are significant, the sole robust link being behavioral detection versus framing resistance, ρ=-0.79, p<0.001). We call this gap the benchmark illusion: because detectability, behavioral manifestation, and controllability vary independently, it is multivariate rather than a single number, so no single awareness score is a reliable proxy for deployment safety.

As large language models (LLMs) become high-privilege agents in risk-sensitive settings, they introduce systemic threats beyond hallucination, where minor compliance errors can cause critical data leaks. However, existing benchmarks focus on rule-based QA, lacking agentic execution modeling, overlooking compliance drift in adversarial interactions, and relying on binary safety metrics that fail to capture behavioral degradation. To bridge these gaps, we present CNFinBench, a comprehensive benchmark spanning 29 subtasks grounded in the triad of expertise, autonomy, and integrity. It assesses domain-specific capabilities through certified regulatory corpora and professional financial tasks, reconstructs end-to-end agent workflows from requirement parsing to tool verification, and simulates multi-turn adversarial attacks that induce behavioral compliance drift. To quantify safety degradation, we introduce the Harmful Instruction Compliance Score (HICS), a multi-dimensional safety metric that integrates risk-type-specific deductions, multi-turn consistency tracking, and severity-adjusted penalty scaling based on fine-grained violation triggers. Evaluations over 22 open-/closed-source models reveal: LLMs perform well in applied tasks yet lack robust rule understanding, suffer a 15.4-point drop single modules to full execution chains, and collapse rapidly in multi-turn attacks, with average violations surging by 172.3% in Round 2. CNFinBench is available at https://cnfinbench.opencompass.org.cn and https://github.com/VertiAIBench/CNFinBench.

Perturbation probing generates task-specific causal hypotheses for FFN neurons in large language models using two forward passes per prompt and no backpropagation, followed by a one-time intervention sweep of about 150 passes amortized across all identified neurons. Across eight behavioral circuits, 13 models, and four architecture families, we identify two circuit structures that organize LLM behavior. Opposition circuits appear when RLHF suppresses a pre-training tendency. In safety refusal, about 50 neurons, or 0.014 percent of all neurons, control the refusal template; ablating them changes 80 percent of response formats on 520 AdvBench prompts while producing near-zero harmful compliance, 3 of 520 cases, all with disclaimers. Routing circuits appear for pre-training behaviors distributed through attention. For language selection, residual-stream direction injection switches English to Chinese output on 99.1 percent of 580 benchmark prompts in the 3 of 19 tested models that satisfy three observed conditions: bilingual training, FFN-to-skip signal ratio between 0.3 and 1.1, and linear representability. The same intervention fails on the other 16 models and on math, code, and factual circuits, defining the limits of directional steering. The FFN-to-skip signal ratio, computed from the same two forward passes, distinguishes the two structures and predicts the appropriate intervention. Circuit topology varies by architecture, from Qwen's concentrated FFN bottleneck to Gemma's normalization-shielded circuit. In Qwen3.5-2B, ablating 20 neurons eliminates multi-turn sycophantic capitulation, while amplifying 10 related neurons improves factual correction from 52 percent to 88 percent on 200 TruthfulQA prompts. These results show that perturbation probing offers mechanistic insight into RLHF-organized behavior and a practical toolkit for precision template-layer editing.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in safety-critical and regulated sectors, the retention of sensitive or prohibited knowledge introduces escalating risks, ranging from privacy leakage to regulatory non-compliance to to potential misuse, and so on. Recent studies suggest that machine unlearning can help ensure deployed models comply with evolving legal, safety, and governance requirements. However, current unlearning techniques assume clean separation between forget and retain datasets, which is challenging in operational settings characterized by highly entangled distributions. In such scenarios, perturbation-based methods often degrade general model utility or fail to ensure safety. To address this, we propose Selective Representation Misdirection for Unlearning (SRMU), a novel principled activation-editing framework that enforces feature-aware and directionally controlled perturbations. Unlike indiscriminate model weights perturbations, SRMU employs a structured misdirection vector with an activation importance map. The goal is to allow SRMU selectively suppresses harmful representations while preserving the utility on benign ones. Experiments are conducted on the widely used WMDP benchmark across low- and high-entanglement configurations. Empirical results reveal that SRMU delivers state-of-the-art unlearning performance with minimal utility losses, and remains effective under 20-30\% overlap where existing baselines collapse. SRMU provides a robust foundation for safety-driven model governance, privacy compliance, and controlled knowledge removal in the emerging LLM-based applications. We release the replication package at https://figshare.com/s/d5931192a8824de26aff.

Selective knowledge erasure from LLMs is critical for GDPR compliance and model safety, yet current unlearning methods conflate behavioral suppression with true knowledge removal, allowing latent capabilities to persist beneath surface-level refusals. In this work, we address this challenge by introducing Knowledge Immunization Framework (KIF), a representation-aware architecture that distinguishes genuine erasure from obfuscation by targeting internal activation signatures rather than surface outputs. Our approach combines dynamic suppression of subject-specific representations with parameter-efficient adaptation, enabling durable unlearning without full model retraining. KIF achieves near-oracle erasure (FQ approx 0.99 vs. 1.00) while preserving utility at oracle levels (MU = 0.62), effectively breaking the stability-erasure tradeoff that has constrained all prior work. We evaluate both standard foundation models (Llama and Mistral) and reasoning-prior models (Qwen and DeepSeek) across 3B to 14B parameters. Our observation shows that standard models exhibit scale-independent true erasure (<3% utility drift), while reasoning-prior models reveal fundamental architectural divergence. Our comprehensive dual-metric evaluation protocol, combining surface-level leakage with latent trace persistence, operationalizes the obfuscation - erasure distinction and enables the first systematic diagnosis of mechanism-level forgetting behavior across model families and scales.

Prior work argues that refusal in large language models is mediated by a single activation-space direction, enabling effective steering and ablation. We show that this account is incomplete. Across eleven categories of refusal and non-compliance, including safety, incomplete or unsupported requests, anthropomorphization, and over-refusal, we find that these refusal behaviors correspond to geometrically distinct directions in activation space. Yet despite this diversity, linear steering along any refusal-related direction produces nearly identical refusal to over-refusal trade-offs, acting as a shared one-dimensional control knob. The primary effect of different directions is not whether the model refuses, but how it refuses.

Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical safety threat to LLMs, as harmful objectives are decomposed across a sequence of apparently benign turns to bypass guardrails. Existing defenses lack the reasoning capacity to identify evolving manipulation patterns, often trading helpfulness for safety by over-refusing benign requests related to sensitive topics. We introduce Trace, a multi-turn defense with trajectory-aware structured reasoning. Before generating each response, the model identifies manipulation cues from the trajectory, evaluates both the benign and adversarial interpretations of user intent, assigns a jailbreak score, and commits to an action: Allow, Caution, or Decline. We curate 4k multi-turn adversarial conversations from five attack frameworks, pair them with 2.4k benign dialogs, and 600 sensitive-but-benign conversations. We train Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct with SFT and GRPO under a multi-component reward that jointly optimizes helpfulness on benign prompts and robustness against jailbreak attempts. Across seven multi-turn attack benchmarks, Trace attains an average attack success rate (ASR) of 14.5% against 31.4% for the strongest baseline and 74.9% for the undefended target, while significantly raising the attacker effort required per successful jailbreak. Trace also balances usability and safety, achieving a 93.3% average compliance on over-refusal benchmarks.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly used in safety-critical applications that require reliable visual grounding. However, these models often hallucinate details that are not present in the image to satisfy user prompts. While recent datasets and benchmarks have been introduced to evaluate systematic hallucinations in VLMs, many hallucination behaviors remain insufficiently characterized. In particular, prior work primarily focuses on object presence or absence, leaving it unclear how prompt phrasing and structural constraints can systematically induce hallucinations. In this paper, we investigate how different forms of prompt pressure influence hallucination behavior. We introduce Ghost-100, a procedurally generated dataset of synthetic scenes in which key visual details are deliberately removed, enabling controlled analysis of absence-based hallucinations. Using a structured 5-Level Prompt Intensity Framework, we vary prompts from neutral queries to toxic demands and rigid formatting constraints. We evaluate three representative open-weight VLMs: MiniCPM-V 2.6-8B, Qwen2-VL-7B, and Qwen3-VL-8B. Across all three models, hallucination rates do not increase monotonically with prompt intensity. All models exhibit reductions at higher intensity levels at different thresholds, though not all show sustained reduction under maximum coercion. These results suggest that current safety alignment is more effective at detecting semantic hostility than structural coercion, revealing model-specific limitations in handling compliance pressure. Our dataset is available at: https://github.com/bli1/tone-matters

This paper presents CyberSecEval, a comprehensive benchmark developed to help bolster the cybersecurity of Large Language Models (LLMs) employed as coding assistants. As what we believe to be the most extensive unified cybersecurity safety benchmark to date, CyberSecEval provides a thorough evaluation of LLMs in two crucial security domains: their propensity to generate insecure code and their level of compliance when asked to assist in cyberattacks. Through a case study involving seven models from the Llama 2, Code Llama, and OpenAI GPT large language model families, CyberSecEval effectively pinpointed key cybersecurity risks. More importantly, it offered practical insights for refining these models. A significant observation from the study was the tendency of more advanced models to suggest insecure code, highlighting the critical need for integrating security considerations in the development of sophisticated LLMs. CyberSecEval, with its automated test case generation and evaluation pipeline covers a broad scope and equips LLM designers and researchers with a tool to broadly measure and enhance the cybersecurity safety properties of LLMs, contributing to the development of more secure AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently produce false refusals, declining benign requests that contain terms resembling unsafe queries. We address this challenge by introducing two comprehensive benchmarks: the Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (XSB) for single-turn prompts, annotated with "Focus" keywords that identify refusal-inducing triggers, and the Multi-turn Scenario-based Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (MS-XSB), which systematically evaluates refusal calibration in realistic, context-rich dialog settings. Our benchmarks reveal that exaggerated refusals persist across diverse recent LLMs and are especially pronounced in complex, multi-turn scenarios. To mitigate these failures, we leverage post-hoc explanation methods to identify refusal triggers and deploy three lightweight, model-agnostic approaches, ignore-word instructions, prompt rephrasing, and attention steering, at inference time, all without retraining or parameter access. Experiments on four instruction-tuned Llama models demonstrate that these strategies substantially improve compliance on safe prompts while maintaining robust safety protections. Our findings establish a reproducible framework for diagnosing and mitigating exaggerated refusals, highlighting practical pathways to safer and more helpful LLM deployments.

Existing alignment research is dominated by concerns about safety and preventing harm: safeguards, controllability, and compliance. This paradigm of alignment parallels early psychology's focus on mental illness: necessary but incomplete. What we call Positive Alignment is the development of AI systems that (i) actively support human and ecological flourishing in a pluralistic, polycentric, context-sensitive, and user-authored way while (ii) remaining safe and cooperative. It is a distinct and necessary agenda within AI alignment research. We argue that several existing failures of alignment (e.g., engagement hacking, loss of human autonomy, failures in truth-seeking, low epistemic humility, error correction, lack of diverse viewpoints, and being primarily reactive rather than proactive) may be better addressed through positive alignment, including cultivating virtues and maximizing human flourishing. We highlight a range of challenges, open questions, and technical directions (e.g., data filtering and upsampling, pre- and post-training, evaluations, collaborative value collection) for different phases of the LLM and agents lifecycle. We end with design principles for promoting disagreement and decentralization through contextual grounding, community customization, continual adaptation, and polycentric governance; that is, many legitimate centers of oversight rather than one institutional or moral chokepoint.

Deploying language models (LMs) necessitates outputs to be both high-quality and compliant with safety guidelines. Although Inference-Time Guardrails (ITG) offer solutions that shift model output distributions towards compliance, we find that current methods struggle in balancing safety with helpfulness. ITG Methods that safely address non-compliant queries exhibit lower helpfulness while those that prioritize helpfulness compromise on safety. We refer to this trade-off as the guardrail tax, analogous to the alignment tax. To address this, we propose PrimeGuard, a novel ITG method that utilizes structured control flow. PrimeGuard routes requests to different self-instantiations of the LM with varying instructions, leveraging its inherent instruction-following capabilities and in-context learning. Our tuning-free approach dynamically compiles system-designer guidelines for each query. We construct and release safe-eval, a diverse red-team safety benchmark. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that PrimeGuard, without fine-tuning, overcomes the guardrail tax by (1) significantly increasing resistance to iterative jailbreak attacks and (2) achieving state-of-the-art results in safety guardrailing while (3) matching helpfulness scores of alignment-tuned models. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that PrimeGuard, without fine-tuning, outperforms all competing baselines and overcomes the guardrail tax by improving the fraction of safe responses from 61% to 97% and increasing average helpfulness scores from 4.17 to 4.29 on the largest models, while reducing attack success rate from 100% to 8%. PrimeGuard implementation is available at https://github.com/dynamofl/PrimeGuard and safe-eval dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/dynamoai/safe_eval.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) constitutes a transformative technological wave that reconfigures industries through its unparalleled capabilities for content creation, reasoning, planning, and multimodal understanding. This revolutionary force offers the most promising path yet toward solving one of engineering's grandest challenges: achieving reliable, fully autonomous driving, particularly the pursuit of Level 5 autonomy. This survey delivers a comprehensive and critical synthesis of the emerging role of GenAI across the autonomous driving stack. We begin by distilling the principles and trade-offs of modern generative modeling, encompassing VAEs, GANs, Diffusion Models, and Large Language Models (LLMs). We then map their frontier applications in image, LiDAR, trajectory, occupancy, video generation as well as LLM-guided reasoning and decision making. We categorize practical applications, such as synthetic data workflows, end-to-end driving strategies, high-fidelity digital twin systems, smart transportation networks, and cross-domain transfer to embodied AI. We identify key obstacles and possibilities such as comprehensive generalization across rare cases, evaluation and safety checks, budget-limited implementation, regulatory compliance, ethical concerns, and environmental effects, while proposing research plans across theoretical assurances, trust metrics, transport integration, and socio-technical influence. By unifying these threads, the survey provides a forward-looking reference for researchers, engineers, and policymakers navigating the convergence of generative AI and advanced autonomous mobility. An actively maintained repository of cited works is available at https://github.com/taco-group/GenAI4AD.

The deployment of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) for real-world document question answering is often constrained by dynamic, user-defined policies that dictate information disclosure based on context. While ensuring adherence to these explicit constraints is critical, existing safety research primarily focuses on implicit social norms or text-only settings, overlooking the complexities of multimodal documents. In this paper, we introduce Doc-PP (Document Policy Preservation Benchmark), a novel benchmark constructed from real-world reports requiring reasoning across heterogeneous visual and textual elements under strict non-disclosure policies. Our evaluation highlights a systemic Reasoning-Induced Safety Gap: models frequently leak sensitive information when answers must be inferred through complex synthesis or aggregated across modalities, effectively circumventing existing safety constraints. Furthermore, we identify that providing extracted text improves perception but inadvertently facilitates leakage. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose DVA (Decompose-Verify-Aggregation), a structural inference framework that decouples reasoning from policy verification. Experimental results demonstrate that DVA significantly outperforms standard prompting defenses, offering a robust baseline for policy-compliant document understanding

Alignment of artificial intelligence (AI) encompasses the normative problem of specifying how AI systems should act and the technical problem of ensuring AI systems comply with those specifications. To date, AI alignment has generally overlooked an important source of knowledge and practice for grappling with these problems: law. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by exploring how legal rules, principles, and methods can be leveraged to address problems of alignment and inform the design of AI systems that operate safely and ethically. This emerging field -- legal alignment -- focuses on three research directions: (1) designing AI systems to comply with the content of legal rules developed through legitimate institutions and processes, (2) adapting methods from legal interpretation to guide how AI systems reason and make decisions, and (3) harnessing legal concepts as a structural blueprint for confronting challenges of reliability, trust, and cooperation in AI systems. These research directions present new conceptual, empirical, and institutional questions, which include examining the specific set of laws that particular AI systems should follow, creating evaluations to assess their legal compliance in real-world settings, and developing governance frameworks to support the implementation of legal alignment in practice. Tackling these questions requires expertise across law, computer science, and other disciplines, offering these communities the opportunity to collaborate in designing AI for the better.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success but remain highly susceptible to jailbreak attacks, in which adversarial prompts coerce models into generating harmful, unethical, or policy-violating outputs. Such attacks pose real-world risks, eroding safety, trust, and regulatory compliance in high-stakes applications. Although a variety of attack and defense methods have been proposed, existing evaluation practices are inadequate, often relying on narrow metrics like attack success rate that fail to capture the multidimensional nature of LLM security. In this paper, we present a systematic taxonomy of jailbreak attacks and defenses and introduce Security Cube, a unified, multi-dimensional framework for comprehensive evaluation of these techniques. We provide detailed comparison tables of existing attacks and defenses, highlighting key insights and open challenges across the literature. Leveraging Security Cube, we conduct benchmark studies on 13 representative attacks and 5 defenses, establishing a clear view of the current landscape encompassing jailbreak attacks, defenses, automated judges, and LLM vulnerabilities. Based on these evaluations, we distill critical findings, identify unresolved problems, and outline promising research directions for enhancing LLM robustness against jailbreak attacks. Our analysis aims to pave the way towards more robust, interpretable, and trustworthy LLM systems. Our code is available at Code.

World models (WMs) have demonstrated strong potential for end-to-end autonomous driving by learning predictive representations of future scene dynamics. However, generating future videos during inference introduces substantial computational overhead, leading many recent driving WMs to adopt a single front camera as input for efficient deployment. This design restricts spatial coverage in safety-critical maneuvers such as lane changes, merges, and turns. To address this limitation, we propose SV-WAM, a surround-view world-action model (WAM) that preserves full six-camera observations while maintaining efficient inference. SV-WAM leverages future-video prediction as dense training supervision for action learning within a shared generative model, rather than as an inference-time output. At the core of this design is an action-centered causal mask that prevents action tokens from attending to future-video tokens during joint action-video denoising. Consequently, the video branch can be discarded at deployment, enabling efficient action-only planning. Furthermore, we introduce a differentiable drivable-area compliance regularizer that penalizes vehicle-footprint corners approaching or crossing drivable boundaries, improving planning safety and boundary awareness. Extensive experiments on the closed-loop NAVSIMv2 benchmark and the open-loop nuScenes benchmark demonstrate that SV-WAM achieves state-of-the-art planning performance with low inference latency and competitive zero-shot transfer capability.

Machine unlearning aims to remove the influence of specific training data from a model without requiring full retraining. This capability is crucial for ensuring privacy, safety, and regulatory compliance. Therefore, verifying whether a model has truly forgotten target data is essential for maintaining reliability and trustworthiness. However, existing evaluation methods often assess forgetting at the level of individual inputs. This approach may overlook residual influence present in semantically similar examples. Such influence can compromise privacy and lead to indirect information leakage. We propose REMIND (Residual Memorization In Neighborhood Dynamics), a novel evaluation method aiming to detect the subtle remaining influence of unlearned data and classify whether the data has been effectively forgotten. REMIND analyzes the model's loss over small input variations and reveals patterns unnoticed by single-point evaluations. We show that unlearned data yield flatter, less steep loss landscapes, while retained or unrelated data exhibit sharper, more volatile patterns. REMIND requires only query-based access, outperforms existing methods under similar constraints, and demonstrates robustness across different models, datasets, and paraphrased inputs, making it practical for real-world deployment. By providing a more sensitive and interpretable measure of unlearning effectiveness, REMIND provides a reliable framework to assess unlearning in language models. As a result, REMIND offers a novel perspective on memorization and unlearning.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have spurred transformative applications in various domains, ranging from open-source to proprietary LLMs. However, jailbreak attacks, which aim to break safety alignment and user compliance by tricking the target LLMs into answering harmful and risky responses, are becoming an urgent concern. The practice of red-teaming for LLMs is to proactively explore potential risks and error-prone instances before the release of frontier AI technology. This paper proposes an agentic workflow to automate and scale the red-teaming process of LLMs through the Composition-of-Principles (CoP) framework, where human users provide a set of red-teaming principles as instructions to an AI agent to automatically orchestrate effective red-teaming strategies and generate jailbreak prompts. Distinct from existing red-teaming methods, our CoP framework provides a unified and extensible framework to encompass and orchestrate human-provided red-teaming principles to enable the automated discovery of new red-teaming strategies. When tested against leading LLMs, CoP reveals unprecedented safety risks by finding novel jailbreak prompts and improving the best-known single-turn attack success rate by up to 19.0 times.

While reinforcement learning for large language model alignment has progressed rapidly in recent years, transferring these paradigms to high-stakes medical question answering reveals a fundamental paradigm mismatch. Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback relies on preference annotations that are prohibitively expensive and often fail to reflect the absolute correctness of medical facts. Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards lacks effective automatic verifiers and struggles to handle complex clinical contexts. Meanwhile, medical alignment requires the simultaneous optimization of correctness, safety, and compliance, yet multi-objective heterogeneous reward signals are prone to scale mismatch and optimization conflicts.To address these challenges, we propose a robust medical alignment paradigm. We first construct a holistic multi-dimensional medical alignment matrix that decomposes alignment objectives into four categories: fundamental capabilities, expert knowledge, online feedback, and format specifications. Within each category, we establish a closed loop of where observable metrics inform attributable diagnosis, which in turn drives optimizable rewards, thereby providing fine-grained, high-resolution supervision signals for subsequent iterative optimization. To resolve gradient domination and optimization instability problem caused by heterogeneous signals, we further propose a unified optimization mechanism. This mechanism employs Reference-Frozen Normalization to align reward scales and implements a Tri-Factor Adaptive Dynamic Weighting strategy to achieve collaborative optimization that is weakness-oriented, risk-prioritized, and redundancy-reducing. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed paradigm in real-world medical scenario evaluations, establishing a new paradigm for complex alignment in vertical domains.

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

In this paper, we study how training data creates associations between the tokens at the start of a base model's response and the reasoning behavior that follows. First, we demonstrate that fixing particular starting token cues makes a base model's performance competitive with that of its reinforcement learning (RL)-trained counterparts on math and coding. For instance, the cue ".\n\nOkay" raises Olmo-3-7B's MATH-500 pass@1 accuracy from 42% to 78%, while "Alright," raises Qwen3-14B's from 72% to 87%. Second, RL makes these cues more likely, while fixing them recovers much of its performance gain over the base model. Third, we trace the reasoning effects of token cues to the training data. We perform causal data interventions to turn an arbitrary word, such as "chicken", into an effective reasoning cue, or remove an existing cue's effect. A similar edit makes the prompt instruction "Think duck duck goose" as effective as "Think step by step" at eliciting reasoning. We also find that the hidden state representations induced by different cues correlate with different document types from the training set. Finally, we extend our study of token cues with a case study in language model safety, finding that different cues elicit distinct refusal and compliance behaviors that correspond to different types of training data.

Pretrained language models underpin several AI applications, but their high computational cost for training limits accessibility. Initiatives such as BLOOM and StarCoder aim to democratize access to pretrained models for collaborative community development. However, such existing models face challenges: limited multilingual capabilities, continual pretraining causing catastrophic forgetting, whereas pretraining from scratch is computationally expensive, and compliance with AI safety and development laws. This paper presents Aurora-M, a 15B parameter multilingual open-source model trained on English, Finnish, Hindi, Japanese, Vietnamese, and code. Continually pretrained from StarCoderPlus on 435 billion additional tokens, Aurora-M surpasses 2 trillion tokens in total training token count. It is the first open-source multilingual model fine-tuned on human-reviewed safety instructions, thus aligning its development not only with conventional red-teaming considerations, but also with the specific concerns articulated in the Biden-Harris Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence. Aurora-M is rigorously evaluated across various tasks and languages, demonstrating robustness against catastrophic forgetting and outperforming alternatives in multilingual settings, particularly in safety evaluations. To promote responsible open-source LLM development, Aurora-M and its variants are released at https://huggingface.co/collections/aurora-m/aurora-m-models-65fdfdff62471e09812f5407 .

Software requirements traceability is a critical component of the software engineering process, enabling activities such as requirements validation, compliance verification, and safety assurance. However, the cost and effort of manually creating a complete set of trace links across natural language artifacts such as requirements, design, and test-cases can be prohibitively expensive. Researchers have therefore proposed automated link-generation solutions primarily based on information-retrieval (IR) techniques; however, these solutions have failed to deliver the accuracy needed for full adoption in industrial projects. Improvements can be achieved using deep-learning traceability models; however, their efficacy is impeded by the limited size and availability of project-level artifacts and links to serve as training data. In this paper, we address this problem by proposing and evaluating several deep-learning approaches for text-to-text traceability. Our method, named NLTrace, explores three transfer learning strategies that use datasets mined from open world platforms. Through pretraining Language Models (LMs) and leveraging adjacent tracing tasks, we demonstrate that NLTrace can significantly improve the performance of LM based trace models when training links are available. In such scenarios NLTrace outperforms the best performing classical IR method with an 188% improvement in F2 score and 94.01% in Mean Average Precision (MAP). It also outperforms the general LM based trace model by 7% and 23% for F2 and MAP respectively. In addition, NLTrace can adapt to low-resource tracing scenarios where other LM models can not. The knowledge learned from adjacent tasks enables NLTrace to outperform VSM models by 28% F2 on generation challenges when presented with a small number of training examples.

Robust unlearning is crucial for safely deploying large language models (LLMs) in environments where data privacy, model safety, and regulatory compliance must be ensured. Yet the task is inherently challenging, partly due to difficulties in reliably measuring whether unlearning has truly occurred. Moreover, fragmentation in current methodologies and inconsistent evaluation metrics hinder comparative analysis and reproducibility. To unify and accelerate research efforts, we introduce OpenUnlearning, a standardized and extensible framework designed explicitly for benchmarking both LLM unlearning methods and metrics. OpenUnlearning integrates 9 unlearning algorithms and 16 diverse evaluations across 3 leading benchmarks (TOFU, MUSE, and WMDP) and also enables analyses of forgetting behaviors across 450+ checkpoints we publicly release. Leveraging OpenUnlearning, we propose a novel meta-evaluation benchmark focused specifically on assessing the faithfulness and robustness of evaluation metrics themselves. We also benchmark diverse unlearning methods and provide a comparative analysis against an extensive evaluation suite. Overall, we establish a clear, community-driven pathway toward rigorous development in LLM unlearning research.

This paper introduces ArGen (Auto-Regulation of Generative AI systems), a framework for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with complex sets of configurable, machine-readable rules spanning ethical principles, operational safety protocols, and regulatory compliance standards. Moving beyond just preference-based alignment, ArGen is designed to ensure LLMs adhere to these multifaceted policies through a novel synthesis of principle-based automated reward scoring, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), and an Open Policy Agent (OPA) inspired governance layer. This approach provides the technical foundation for achieving and demonstrating compliance with diverse and nuanced governance requirements. To showcase the framework's capability to operationalize a deeply nuanced and culturally-specific value system, we present an in-depth case study: the development of a medical AI assistant guided by principles from Dharmic ethics (such as Ahimsa and Dharma), as derived from texts like the Bhagavad Gita. This challenging application demonstrates ArGen's adaptability, achieving a 70.9% improvement in domain-scope adherence over the baseline. Through our open-source repository, we show that ArGen's methodology offers a path to 'Governable Al' systems that are technically proficient, ethically robust, and verifiably compliant for safe deployment in diverse global contexts.

Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.